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ABSTRACT  
The shift from a domestic currency (peso) to dollar denominated deposits (deposit 
dollarization) in Argentina and Bolivia is explained with a nonlinear model that 
incorporates ratcheting effects, hysteresis and network externalities.  There are two 
principal factors behind these effects: holding and transacting costs.  The depreciation 
rate of a local currency versus an international monetary standard (peso versus dollar) is a 
reasonable proxy for the holding cost of the local currency.  Strong depreciation of a 
currency imposes a substantial holding cost on its users and increases or “ratchets up” 
how high agents predict future depreciation rates will be.  A transaction cost is incurred 
whenever an agent transacts outside his/her currency network of buyers and sellers.  The 
model assumes there are two currency networks; one is based on the peso and the other 
on the dollar.  A transaction network externality arises when relative returns or savings to 
using a given currency increase as the size of that currency’s network of users expands.  
This externality makes the currency choice of an individual partially dependent on the 
choices others in his/her reference group or network make.  Hysteresis, the persistence of 
high dollarization, happens when the expected holding cost of the dollar is less than the 
peso due to ratcheting effect, and/or converting back to the peso imposes a substantial 
transaction cost due to the large size of the dollar network.  Under certain network 
dynamics and behavioral assumptions, dollarization levels can follow a nonlinear path to 
rest at an either high or low-equilibrium point.  Resting at either high or low dollarization 
equilibria depends on the presence and location of an unstable third intermediate 
iv 
equilibrium point.  A shock to the holding cost of at least one currency is needed to 
establish a new equilibrium position.  For example, a spike in peso’s depreciation ratchets 
up its expected holding cost and establishes a new nonlinear path that leads to higher 
dollarization equilibria, which the model expects the economy to start moving towards.  
The opposite outcome can happen if a strong contractionary policy appreciates the peso 
and reduces its holding cost. 
To Zahra. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... ix 
Chapters 
1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................10 
Development of the Currency and Asset Substitution Literature ................................10 
Early Approaches to Money Demand ..........................................................................11 
Contemporary Currency Substitution Research...........................................................22 
The Market and Institutions View and the Reemergence of Cost Functions ..............25 
3 THE MODEL ...............................................................................................................38 
Theoretical Approach...................................................................................................38 
Cost Functions .............................................................................................................41 
Expectations and Functional Forms .............................................................................48 
Econometric Equation ..................................................................................................52 
4 CASE STUDIES: ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA .....................................................54 
The Dollarization Phenomenon ...................................................................................54 
Argentina’s Case Study................................................................................................58 
Bolivia’s Case Study ....................................................................................................73 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................87 
vii 
Appendices 
A BOLIVIA’S CASE STUDY ........................................................................................90 
B STATISTICAL DISCUSSION ....................................................................................99 
C MODEL PARAMETERS SIMULATION ................................................................105 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Descriptive Statistics of Argentina’s Model Variables ................................................63 
2. Argentina’s Regression Fit and Estimated Parameters’ Results ..................................63 
3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller of Unit Root Tests With a Trend ......................................65 
4. Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test of the Demeaned and Detrended Case ...............67 
5. Descriptive Statistics of Bolivia’s Model Variables ....................................................77 
6. Bolivia’s Regression Fit and Estimated Parameters Results .......................................77 
7. Augmented Dickey-Fuller of Unit Root Tests With a Trend ......................................78 
8. Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test of the Demeaned and Detrended Case ...............79 
9. IFS: Bolivia’s Deposit Data by Currency Denomination ............................................90 
10. IFS: Bolivia’s Deposit Interest Rate by Denomination ...............................................91 
11. Model Simulation Data ................................................................................................93 
12. Nonlinear Regression Results Estimation Summary ...................................................94 
13. Unit Root Tests of Regression Variables .....................................................................95 
14. Values Used in Testing Different Model Specifications .............................................98 
15. IFS: Argentina’s Deposit Interest Rate by Denomination .........................................110 
16. IFS: Argentina’s Deposit Data by Currency Denomination ......................................111 
17. Model Simulation Data ..............................................................................................114 
18. Nonlinear Regression Results Estimation Summary .................................................115 
19. Unit Root Tests of Regression Variables ...................................................................116 
20. Values Used in Different Model Specifications 1 .....................................................121 
21. Values Used in Different Model Specifications 2 .....................................................121 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Lance Girton and Prof. David 
Kiefer for helping me to think like an economist and for their extensive guidance in the 




The importance of the “dollarization” phenomenon emanates from its impact on 
the ability of central banks to effectively conduct monetary policy by controlling 
domestic money supply, inflation and interest rates.  Ineffective domestic monetary 
policy can mean substantial general welfare losses, disruption to local prices and 
financial asset valuations, and financial crises.  General welfare can also be negatively 
impacted as domestic money supply conditions become strongly linked to the monetary 
policy of foreign authorities like the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) or the European 
Central Bank (ECB).  At any given time the prevailing policies of these authorities may 
or may not be in harmony with what is optimal for the macro conditions at a dollarized 
economy.  A foreign central bank may undertake contractionary policies like raising 
interest rates to cool off a rapidly growing economy and rising prices while local 
conductions in a dollarized economy need lower interest rates to spur a stagnant 
economy.   
While policy makers may decide that stopping or reversing dollarization is good 
for the country, an individual agent or an economic sector may be better off using strong 
and popular foreign currencies like the dollar or the Euro instead of a weak local 
currency.  At a very basic level, a product or service is substituted or preferred over a 
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rival one because an agent expects to derive more utility.  The choice to substitute a 
foreign currency for a local one requires these two currencies to be rivals that offer 
similar benefits.  It is commonly stated that money has three main benefits or functions: 
store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account.  An agent needs to decide which 
currency offers more of these benefits among rival currencies.  Therefore currencies have 
to be seen as rivals or competitors for substitution to take place.   
Dollarization results from competition between different currencies, where a 
foreign one competes over the market share and functionality of a local one.  Agents’ 
choices determine the outcome of this currency competition based on their needs, market 
constraints and legal barriers or official policies that can either encourage, discourage or 
be neutral.  Under reasonably free market conditions, agents are expected to choose the 
money brand that will best serve their needs today and in the future.  It is a reversed 
Gresham law outcome where good money drives bad money out of circulation (Cohen, 
2004).   
In any given open economy, it is normal for some sectors to use foreign 
currencies regularly, like the export and import, and financial services sectors for 
example.  These sectors can play a vital role in introducing foreign currencies to the rest 
of the economy as viable alternatives to the local currency.  As the presence and 
circulation of foreign currencies takes hold, partial or full foreign currency networks may 
develop where buyers and sellers deal primarily or only in foreign currencies.  The 
immediate benefit of a currency network is the reduction in transaction cost because deals 
are conducted directly in the same medium of exchange, dollars, without having to 
exchange them into pesos.  The initial development of user base for a currency network 
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can be hard and driven by certain incentives; subsequent users may be attracted for other 
reasons.  All other things being constant, as a network increases in size, it becomes more 
beneficial to join because of the increased chance of transacting with users in the same 
network.  In other words, as a network increases in size it creates a positive spillover or 
externality effects that can encourage more to join. 
In the literature, the general term of dollarization can be associated with the 
substitution of foreign currencies for local ones as: medium of transaction (currency 
substitution or dollarization), store of value (deposit/asset substitution or dollarization,) 
and unit of account (dollarization of liabilities and contracts: denominating contracts, 
liabilities and prices in foreign currencies).  In this research the terms asset substitution, 
deposit substitution, dollarization, and deposit dollarization are used synonymously.   
McKinnon (2001) observes that the dollar started to be used widely in Latin 
American domestic markets, first as a store of value and next as the preferred medium of 
exchange (see also Feige, Faulend, Sonje, & Sosic, 2003).  The shift from local 
currencies to dollar denominated deposits in Argentina’s and Bolivia’s banking sectors 
provides an excellent view of the gradual erosion of the store of value function of the 
Argentine peso and the Bolivian Boliviano (see Figures 1 and 2). 
In Argentina’s case, Figure 1 shows a succession of hyperdepreciation episodes1 
that drove the deposit dollarization ratio (DDR)2 to higher levels.  After the peso’s 280%  
                                                 
1 Exchange Rate Increase = Depreciation (e) = the log of (the Argentine Peso (or Bolivian 
Bolivano) / U.S. Dollar) quarterly market exchange rate, e = 100 * ln (Xt / Xt-1).  Exchange Rate Increase 
and Depreciation Rate will be used as synonyms.   
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Figure 1: Argentina’s exchange rate depreciation and dollarization 
history. 
  
Figure 2: Bolivia’s exchange rate depreciation and dollarization 
history.   
                                                                                                                                                 
2 DDR = Foreign currency denominated deposits / total deposits, see Appendix A for an 
explanation of data sources and formulas. 
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depreciation free fall (exchange rate increase) in Q2 1989, deposit dollarization rose from 
about 13% at the time to 47% by the end of 1989.  Dollarization subsided to around 35% 
afterward under a better controlled peso exchange value.  However, in the Q1 1991, the 
Argentine peso (the peso) dropped again by 54% against the dollar.  The drop was 
accompanied by a sharp increase in dollarization to over half of all deposits in the 
banking system.  After this latest bout with depreciation, the Argentine government 
declared an official commitment to the stability of the peso.  This commitment was lent 
credibility by the establishment of a currency board regime under the supervision of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Despite this commitment, financial dollarization in 
Argentina did not reverse course.  In fact, dollarization continued to climb, up to 70%, 
before the government forcibly converted all foreign deposits into pesos in early 2002.   
In this dissertation, Oomes’ (2003) model is modified and employed to explain 
Argentina’s and Bolivia’s experiences with deposit dollarization.  Figure 3 graphically 
simulates the model,3 which relates asset dollarization in the previous period (pt-1) to its 
predicted level currently (pt).  Deposit dollarization is at an equilibrium (p*) along the 
45 degree line, where (pt = pt-1) and the dollarization path intersects the 45 degree line 
from above.   
The main interesting outcome is that under the right circumstances and with the 
help of a logistic function, more than one steady dollarization state can exist in an  
                                                 
3 The equation used to generate the simulation is pt = (1 + exp {_ 1/φ [et – σt + 2 σ pt-1]})-1.  
Parameter values are φ = 0.05, σt = 0.25 and et = 0.08, 0.13 and 0.17.  These values were used for 
illustrative purpose only. 
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Figure 3: Modeling deposit dollarization with network and 
hysteresis effects. 
economy.  The empirical evidence supporting the model indicates that steady 
dollarization levels (p*’s) may not have a linear relationship with the rate of depreciation 
and other factors as typical portfolio balance models suggest.  Also, successive 
deteriorations in a local currency’s exchange rate diminish the value of peso denominated 
balances and increase the cost of holding or using the peso as a store of value.  Concerns 
about further purchasing power losses drive people to switch their savings to dollars.  
This is captured in the model by upward shifts in the dollarization path curves e = 8%, 
13% and 18% in Figure 3.  The model predicts that when the depreciation rate (e) 
increases from 8% to 13%, the dollarization curve jumps from the lower curve (e = 8%) 
to the intermediate one (e = 13%).  However it does not fall back when the peso’s 
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depreciation returns to a 8% rate.  This is because previous depreciation spikes can have a 
lingering impact that “ratchets up” how high future depreciation rates are expected to be.   
This ratcheting effect directly increases the expected holding cost of pesos and 
can induce peso users to convert their holdings into a foreign currency.  Risk-averse 
agents may not adjust their depreciation expectation downward quickly for fear of getting 
caught in another hyperdepreciation episode.  This conversion can produce an increased 
popularity for the foreign currency and extend its use from a store of value, because of its 
lower holding cost relative to the local currency, to being used as a unit of account and a 
medium of exchange.  In other words, the number of agents holding and using dollars 
increases, thus increasing the dollar network.  The main result from the expansion of any 
currency network is to reduce the expected transaction cost to the users of that currency 
as these agents do not have to do any currency switching to conclude transactions.  This 
encroachment on the monetary functions of the local currency can further increase the 
use of the dollar and the dollarization levels in the economy and may not be easily 
reversible.  The short run increase in dollarization during or after a currency crisis 
(induced by a financial or balance of payment troubles) can become a status quo, even 
after crisis conditions have passed, thus producing a “hysteresis” outcome.  Dollarization 
hysteresis describes a situation when agents do not have an incentive to switch back to 
the local risky currency because a combination of high holding cost expectations and a 
decrease in the cost of transacting with the dollar may not make it worthwhile.   
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The middle curve in Figure 3 also has three extreme values.  While the upper and 
lower values (points A and C) are always stable the intermediate one (point B) is not.4  
Point B acts as a tipping point in the balance between the strength of rival currency 
networks that determine the transaction cost associated with using a currency.  A 
currency network is made up of all those agents deciding to hold and transact primarily in 
that currency, with the possibility of transacting with other agents belonging to other 
currencies as needed.  When intracurrency- network transaction takes place, a transaction 
cost is imposed.  Transaction cost is a term that can include many different costs that may 
arise when two currencies are in use, like government fees, switching cost (the cost of 
exchanging one currency for another), “shoe leather” cost of finding a currency exchange 
facility, etc.  In this dissertation transaction cost and switching cost will be used 
synonymously.  If the dollarization ratio passes point B (DDR > 55%) in the previous 
period, it will be expected to continue to rise until the upper equilibrium point (A) is 
reached.  This is because the dollar “network externality” effect is expected to continue to 
increase the reward of converting away from the peso network by lowering transaction 
cost for new users until the dollar network is the dominant one.   
This research examines Argentina’s and Bolivia’s history with deposit dollarization 
and finds that it can explain a good deal of the pattern in Figures 1 and 2.  In the next 
chapter, I will discuss the literature on currency substitution and dollarization, and the 
                                                 
4 The arrows depict how the upper and lower equilibriums are arrived at.  For example, if 
dollarization at Pt-1 is below point B but above point A, the level today will trend downward until it rests at 
point A.   
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evolution of different modeling approaches over the past four decades.  In Chapter 3, I 
will discuss the theoretical approach of this dissertation and the model that generates the 
dynamics in Figure 3.  In the final chapter, Chapter 5, the data and empirical results used 





Development of the Currency and Asset Substitution Literature 
This chapter will present a literature review of research done principally in the 
area of currency and asset substitution.  The presentation will track the growth and 
development in this field over the past 60 years.  The story that emerges shows how ideas 
ignored at one time may regain popularity later due to subsequent theoretical 
development elsewhere.  The reincarnation of the transaction-cost focused models of the 
1950s again in the late 1990s and early 2000s was made possible by the introduction of 
network dynamics research.  For a long spell from the 1970s until the 1990s, the rival 
portfolio approach to money demand and currency substitution was the dominant one.   
The excitement that network based research brought relates to the use of nonlinear 
functions that incorporate, among other things, cost functions.  Nonlinear cost functions 
helped slow down the substitution process, especially at the extremes of either full or no 
dollarization.  This is a considerable departure from the typical corner or extreme 
outcomes of portfolio based work.  Furthermore, the spectrum of issues examined or 
incorporated has widened to include the further development of currency and asset 
substitution concepts, the use of cash-in-advance simplifying assumption, the use of 
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intertemporal dynamic analysis, and the development of econometrically estimable 
models.   
As mentioned, the first part will discuss the earliest foundational theoretical work 
of the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the pioneering contributions of the 1970s.  The 
second part of this literature survey will discuss the continued interest and developments 
in the portfolio approach between the 1980s and early 2005.  The last part discuses the 
market view, a term used to describe the body of work that pays close attention to the role 
of market mechanism to explain currency and asset substitution.   
Early Approaches to Money Demand 
The building blocks for the currency substitution literature may be traced back to 
money demand research in the 1950s of the last century.  Money demand discussion in 
turn maybe traced as far back as the 19th century.  The issue then was centered around 
the nature and makeup of money demand and its impact on monetary policy in a 
framework of: one nation one money.  Even then, it was recognized that some currencies 
play a vital international role in facilitating global trade and finance, like the British 
pound (Eichengreen, 2005).  Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1952) built the early structure of 
what can be termed the “transaction cost approach to money demand.”  Soon after, Tobin 
(1958) developed a significant alternative to understand money demand by suggesting a 
portfolio based approach.  These two approaches are discussed next.  The discussion will 
pay special attention to the pioneering work of those who developed the theory of 
substitutable monies on the portfolio approach like Girton and Roper (1976, 1986), Calvo 
and Rodriguez (1977) and Miles (1978).   
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Baumol and Tobin Transaction Cost Approach 
The work of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) formally introduced transaction 
costs in optimization models, along with payments practices and foregone interest.  
Baumol and Tobin’s early work was influenced by mathematical inventory theory.  This 
theory assumes the presence of two assets, money and interest earning investment.  
Agents choose “the optimal frequency for money-security transfers so as to maximize 
interest earnings net of transaction costs” (McCallum & Goodfriend, 1986, p. 13). 
The transaction approach was largely ignored in the 1970s due to the difficulty of 
deriving practical application as compared with the portfolio approach.  The transaction 
approach was purely theoretical and technical in nature and on its own did not lend itself 
easily to real life issues.  The predictions of models utilizing this approach tended to strict 
relationships and very precise interaction.  At the time, it was not readily clear how the 
transaction cost approach could contribute to currency substitution discussion and the 
present research.  The substitution that was discussed in this early transaction cost 
approach was focused on various asset types or assets versus an official money brand.  In 
a world of one currency per country and globally fixed exchange rates through the 
Bretton Wood system of fixed exchange rates, currency competition was simply not 
relevant.   
Currency competition is a prerequisite for substitution to take place.  If two 
currencies were assumed to be rivals, a slight cost advantage for one over the other will 
leave only one currency standing.  No stable money demand equilibrium for a currency 
can be found if it is not cost effective and competitive enough versus other assets or 
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currencies.  The pessimistic view about the usefulness of the transaction cost approach 
persisted until the introduction of network effects much later.   
Tobin’s Portfolio Approach 
Tobin pursued a different approach to money demand by using a portfolio 
allocation structure.  In his 1958 paper, Tobin’s stated “what needs to be explained is not 
only the existence of a demand for cash when its yield is less than the yield on alternative 
assets but an inverse relationship between the aggregate demand for cash and the size of 
this differential in yields” (p. 65).  Cash money demand exists to satisfy transaction and 
investment needs.  The transaction need depends on the synchronization between the 
inflow and outflow of money balances or to cover possible gaps between expenditures 
and receipts, especially when credit is not allowed.  The investment cash money demand 
exists “because of expectations or fears of loss on other assets.  It is here, in what Keynes 
called the speculative motives of investors, that the explanation of liquidity preference 
and of the interest elasticity of the demand for cash has been sought” (Tobin, 1958, 
p. 67).  Agents need to decide how much cash money to hold as an investment versus 
other monetary assets that pay variable interest rates.  Tobin considered money as just 
another monetary asset that is riskless and pays zero interest rate.  All monetary assets 
share the characteristics of being marketable, fixed in money value and free of default 
risk.  Tobin’s (1958) “liquidity preference theory” attempts to explain how a given 
amount of wealth is allocated among various alternatives of monetary assets (p. 66).   
The portfolio makeup of monetary assets is assumed to happen under conditions 
of uncertainty regarding interest rates and price fluctuations.  Uncertainty of returns on 
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some classes of assets, like consoles, produce risk of capital gain or loss.  In this 
situation, an agent will form expectations about the risk and return of certain monetary 
assets according to a probability distribution with an expected value of zero (Tobin, 
1958). 
In a further development, Tobin (1963) discussed the substitutability option 
among different financial and nonfinancial assets in a portfolio.  A portfolio owner is 
thought to have a range of options of asset as well as credit instruments to hold.  The mix 
of assets and credit depends on how each asset contributes to the overall riskiness of the 
portfolio.  Savings deposits, for example, are perfect substitutes for demand deposits in 
every respect except as a medium of exchange.  Savings deposits can overcome, to 
certain extent, the high liquidity advantage of checking accounts by differences in yield.  
People can have a choice between a riskless asset (money) and an asset with a return that 
exceeds that of money.  “Tobin shows how the optimal portfolio mix depends, under the 
assumption of expected utility maximization, on the individual’s degree of risk aversion, 
his wealth, and the mean-variance characteristics of the risky asset’s return distribution” 
(McCallum & Goodfriend, 1986, p. 15).   
Some of the prominent critiques of Tobin’s new approach focused on his 
assumption that money is riskless, once inflation is considered, and ignoring the 
possibility of having a rival asset that is as riskless as money but with a higher average 
return5 (Barro & Fischer, 1976).  Another critique is that Tobin seems to put aside 
                                                 
5 This is especially true when Treasury Inflation-Protected securities (TIPs) are considered. 
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nonpecuniary returns on money, like liquidity and transactions services.  Liquidity 
demands for cash money was mentioned in Tobin’s 1958 paper but was not the focus of 
his interest there.  He just assumed that other monetary assets are reasonably marketable 
or liquid.  The ability of the portfolio framework to handle variations in risk and return 
specifications made it possible for subsequent research to account for the earlier 
criticisms, as extensions to Tobin’s work showed in the 1970s.   
Friedman’s restatement of the quantity theory, in a 1956 book chapter, supported 
and generalized Tobin’s idea that the principal role of money is being a form of wealth 
that needs to be allocated optimally.  Friedman’s contribution emphasized margins of 
substitution between money and a broader range of financial assets other than bonds and 
even real assets and durable goods (see McCallum & Goodfriend, 1986).  Friedman 
(2005) suggested that money demand yields a stream of benefits to the holder along three 
principal factors: wealth constraint, return on money versus other financial and real asset, 
and asset holder’s preferences.  Friedman’s followers “argue that money is a substitute 
for a wide range of real and financial assets, and that no single asset or group of assets 
can be considered to be a close substitute for money” (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 168).  
This opinion may be true as long as there is one medium-of-exchange in circulation.  The 
presence of more than one money brand will further lower the substitution margin as 
currencies start to compete with each other.   
The Girton and Roper Currency Substitution Extension 
The earliest use of the term “currency substitution” appeared in a 1974 working 
paper by Girton and Roper, published in 1981.  Miles’s 1978, and Calvo and Rodriguez’s 
   
16
1977 papers were among the other early significant contributions to the currency 
substitution literature.  These papers used portfolio models to discuss the role of currency 
substitution in an economy.  One common concern is the interaction between currency 
substitution on one hand, monetary policy and exchange rates on the other hand.  Real 
rates of return, measured as the nominal interest rate minus inflation, play a pivotal role 
in determining what currency people will hold.  Overall, the discussion is slanted to 
debating different exchange rate policies.  Transaction cost consideration in these early 
writings appears as a constant coefficient across different asset types and is implicitly 
estimated by other macro variables.  No specific functional form was assumed for 
transaction cost.  Following is a more detailed discussion of these early contributions. 
Girton and Roper (1981) introduced a “pure theory of multiple currencies” to 
discuss money demand independently of the number of countries or regions.  The theory 
combines ideas from both domestic and international monetary economics.  It also 
introduces the concept of currency substitution and formalizes it in a portfolio model of 
asset demand.  Currency substitution assails the notion that national economies work with 
only one money brand in circulation.  The choice to hold a portfolio of more than one 
currency used to be the narrow concern of international business and frequent travelers.  
After the demise of the Bretton Woods system that coordinated exchange rates around the 
world, currencies exchange rate values fluctuated widely.  The culprit behind the 
fluctuation, in the most part, was inflationary financing measures.  These measures had a 
direct negative impact on the purchasing power of currency holders.  Thus, it made sense 
to replace a local currency with another asset that has reasonable medium of exchange 
functionality and a better rate of return.   
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The asset portfolio model of Girton and Roper included an exchange rate term.  
The model used a coefficient of substitution that depended on the difference in expected 
real return on various currencies and a coefficient of substitution between a currency and 
nonmonetary assets.  The share of a currency in a portfolio depends on the difference 
between expected real return on a currency and nonmonetary assets.   
Under conditions of rational expectations and perfect currency substitution, the 
model exhibited dynamic instability and the exchange rate end up being indeterminate.  
The model predicted that for a given shock, the higher the degree of substitutability the 
larger the jumps required to get to a new equilibrium (a result also explicitly and 
independently argued by Kareken and Wallace in 1981).  Among the important 
assumptions behind the instability is exogenously supplied money and nominally fixed 
rates of return on money.  Currency arbitrage was also assumed to maintain stable 
purchasing power for the currencies.  However, small differences in anticipated inflation 
rates can sway real return leading to large exchange rate movement or corner solutions.   
When the authors modified the model by using bond exchange rate to study bond 
substitution, stability was achieved (Kareken & Wallace, 1981).  This outcome is 
attributed to the denomination of the return on bonds in terms of money and not some 
more bond units.  This distinction in the terms of return between currency and bond 
substitution is fundamental to understanding the difference in the nature of the two 
categories of assets.  This is a departure from Tobin’s assertion that the essential 
difference between money and bonds is the exogenously fixed nominal interest on 
money.   
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The bond analysis helped explain what happens when substituting money is an 
option by highlighting the store of value function of money.  When more than one 
currency option presents itself, people can put a price on one currency in terms of 
another.  An exogenously imposed negative return on a currency (e.g., from inflation) 
will depreciate its value in terms of other currencies.  Agents concerned about the store of 
value property of a depreciating currency will switch to another one to protect their 
wealth.   
Girton and Roper also argued that rational central banks will not over supply 
money if people can substitute one currency for another easily.  Central banks’ profit 
maximization consideration changes radically when agents have currency choices and no 
longer can they run the press until the value of a currency is equal to the paper it is 
printed on as Friedman (1968) suggested.  The authors asserted that there is no positive 
spillover effect in the production of money.  Competitive pressure among currencies is 
real and will force efficient allocation of resources as long as the issuing authorities do 
not collude to maintain market share.  When monetary authorities do not have sole 
monopoly over money supply, agents can quickly switch to another currency leaving the 
inferior one behind.  “Money holders choose between monies on the basis of anticipated 
real rates of return, consequently banks compete on the basis of anticipated real rates of 
real return” (Girton & Roper, 1981, p. 22).   
When the model was modified to admit endogenous money supplies, instability in 
exchange rates under perfect currency substitution disappeared.  The endogenous supply 
process implies the need for active management of real return on money and thus the 
maintenance of demand and market share.  Consequently, if only one issuing authority 
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actively manages the supply of its money, it will gain market share at the expense of a 
nonmanaged brand of money.  Hence, Friedman’s argument for the superiority of money 
supplied at a fixed rate was put into serious doubt (see Friedman, 1968).   
The currency substitution concept picked up steam with subsequent contribution 
that also used the portfolio framework.  Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) note that “The same 
argument of portfolio diversification and transaction cost which can be used to justify the 
demand for domestic money are also applicable to foreign exchange” (p. 617).  The 
authors used a two-sector model of exchange rate determination to analyze the impact of 
currency substitution on monetary policy.  They used a liquidity preference function to 
determine the optimal proportion of holding two assets in a portfolio.  Currency 
substitution, defined as the ratio of domestic to foreign currency holdings, is assumed to 
be a function of the expected difference in the rates of return on both assets.  Under 
perfect foresight conditionality, currency substitution levels change in equal proportion to 
the actual change in the exchange rate.  The main policy implication of the model is to 
argue that if one accounts for currency substitution, monetary expansion will directly lead 
to an increase in the accumulation of foreign currencies.   
Miles’s (1978) paper represented another early important work that benefited 
from the development of currency substitution concept.  Miles addressed the common 
argument that a flexible foreign exchange regime can insulate domestic economies from 
foreign financial shocks.  This insulation allows central banks to exercise monetary 
independence and freedom to pursue activist policies.  The author thoughtfully observes 
that flexible rates can achieve this with the assumption that currencies are not perfect 
substitutes on the supply side as is the case under a regime of fixed exchange rates.  
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However, if currencies are substitutable on the demand side, this perceived advantage of 
flexible rates disappears.   
Miles uses a real cash balance portfolio that varies in size with the level of real 
income and the rate of return on other types of assets.  The make-up of the portfolio will 
vary with the relevant opportunity costs of holding real balances of different brands of 
money.  Rising inflation increases the opportunity cost of holding a currency.  People will 
reduce their holdings of the riskier (inflation prone) currency by switching to another one.  
Real balances, denominated in terms of both domestic and foreign currencies, from an 
individual’s cash balance portfolio are combined in a production function for money 
services.  Given the relative efficiencies of domestic and foreign currencies in producing 
money services (defined by a production function) and the relative opportunity costs of 
holding different currencies (reflected in the asset constraint), an individual tries to 
maximize production of monetary services to where marginal costs equal marginal 
benefits.  The determinant for the mix of the portfolio depends principally on changes in 
the relative opportunity cost of different currencies.  The production function directly 
associates the amount of real balances with the amount of money services received from 
a currency.  The amount of service a currency generates is inferred by the size of real 
balance holdings.  Real balances are measured in terms of a standard commodity.  To 
simplify the model, an exchange rate is used to determine the value of currency holdings.  
Changes in inflation affects real returns to holding a particular currency and increases its 
opportunity cost.  People respond by reducing their portfolio’s exposure to the weakening 
currency.   
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The “Denationalization of Money” book by Hayek (1978) addressed the supply 
side monopoly over money by central banks.  He used the currency substitution idea to 
advocate giving private banks the freedom to issue their own currencies.  He suggested 
that people will agree to hold private banks’ notes if they are backed, for example, by an 
index of goods.  Many currencies may coexist at market-determined exchange rates.  At 
the end of the day, the better currency will drive away the other(s).  Banks are expected 
to have responsible money supply policies or risk loss of confidence in their money 
brands.  Loss of confidence will drive the holders of a currency to convert their holdings 
into other ones or into real goods, thus producing a bank-run like outcome.  Hayek saw in 
deregulating money production a chance for people to escape depreciating, government 
issued, money.  Hayek hoped that government’s oppressive ability to finance its 
expenditure by taxing money holders would diminish when currencies compete for 
people’s trust and acceptance (see Holmes, 1977).   
This line of logic touched off intense discussion about the merits and demerits of 
ceding domestic monopoly over money supply and with it a great deal of monetary policy 
power over the domestic economy (see Calvo, 2002; Ize & Levy-Yeyati, 1998).  It is also 
not clear in Hayek’s book what will happen if a currency issuing bank abused its money 
supply ability and its customers (those holding the currency that bank issued) and caused 
a systemic failure in financial markets.  Should the central bank continue to act as a 
lender of last resort to bail out failing banks?  Maybe a currency insurance agency can be 
established to protect private currency holders after the model of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  Nevertheless, Hayek’s theoretical construct of free and 
competitive money supply is very useful in assessing currency substitution under such 
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extreme conditions.  The next section will discuss the most significant theoretical 
contribution in the 20 plus years that followed the end of the 1970s.   
Contemporary Currency Substitution Research 
The creation of the European monetary union was essentially a political project 
that used Mundell’s optimal currency area theory to provide economic doctrine 
legitimacy (McKinnon, 2002; Mundell, 2000, 2003; Padoa, 2003; von Furstenberg, 
2001).  Beside the political aspirations of policy makers in Europe, the real economic 
challenge was to stand up to the increasing competitiveness of the U.S. dollar.  Globally, 
the dollar plays a premier role as a reserve currency in foreign central banks, including 
European and communist ones, and as the currency of choice to price and conduct 
international trade, including most of Europe’s transactions with the rest of the world (see 
Kenen, 2002; Portes, Ray, De Grauwe, & Honkapohja, 1998; Rogoff, 2004).   
Globalization of finance further extended the dollar’s domain beyond 
international trade.  The lure of the dollar touches even the domestic domain of national 
currencies, just as Girton and Roper (1981) theorized and Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) 
predicted.  The dollarization term became the new face of the wide substitution of 
national currencies in Latin America and elsewhere with the dollar, a currency perceived 
superior to local ones.  Modeling work in the 1980s and 1990s increasingly paid more 
attention to dollarization as a process initiated and propagated by individuals.  As the 
following discussion will show, the portfolio model continued to play an important role 
during this time period.  However, the cash-in-advance framework, international currency 
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competition theory, network and irreversibility or hysteresis effects were among the 
significant new contributions in the field.   
As the dollar penetrated the local financial markets of Latin America and 
elsewhere, new portfolio based models emerged to specifically deal with this new reality 
that required fresh treatment.  The term financial dollarization emerged to refer to the 
wide acceptance of the dollar as the denomination of deposits, securities, loans and in the 
pricing and fulfillment of local contracts.  In short, financial dollarization refers to the 
dollarization of assets and liabilities (Ize & Levy-Yeyati, 1998).  Generally, portfolio 
based models explained the emerging dollarization as the optimal portfolio choice for a 
given distribution of real returns in each currency.  Even under an unstable exchange rate 
regime, individuals may assign low chance to a devaluation actually taking place.  If 
devaluation materializes they expect the local currency (for example the peso) to 
collapse.  This small risk probability of large loss broadens the peso-dollar spread.  The 
size of the spread may grow to a point at which the default risk of a peso borrower 
indebted at a high interest rate exceeds the risk of a dollar borrower that faces a sure loan 
default only in the unlikely devaluation scenario (Levy-Yeyati, 2005).  Specified 
functions for money supply shock and future growth rate expectations played an 
important part in modeling work during this period and still do today.   
The capital asset portfolio model of Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) put the focus on 
the banking sector’s role in encouraging dollarization.  In their financial intermediation 
model, money choice is decided by hedging decision on both sides of a bank’s balance 
sheet.  Hence, the two sides of financial dollarization, assets and liabilities, interact 
through the loanable funds market.  This interaction brings about financial equilibria that 
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gravitate around interest rate parity and minimum variance portfolio allocations.  The use 
of minimum variance portfolio allocation provides a natural benchmark to estimate the 
degree of deposit and loan dollarization, given macroeconomic uncertainty.  At 
equilibrium, asset substitution is explained by the volatility of inflation (the second 
moments) instead of the usual and simpler expected inflation rate (the first moment).  
This is an important variation, not usually encountered in the literature.   
A pass-through coefficient of exchange rate changes with prices in the model and 
helps link the financial with the real sector.  This makes it hard for exchange rate policy 
to reverse dollarization once it is deeply ingrained.  The displacement of local currencies 
by a foreign one can exhibit hysteresis symptoms, or in other words become irreversible, 
if the expected volatility of the inflation rate is excessive in relation to that of the real 
exchange rate (or inflation abroad).  This implies that dollarization should be seen, at 
least partially as, “a natural consequence of trade liberalization and international 
economic integration.  Hence, attempts to limit it can be ill-advised” (Ize & Levy-Yeyati, 
1998, p. 4). 
In a more recent paper, de Freitas and Viega (2006) discuss the dynamic 
optimization of money demand and its impact on currency substitution.  Portfolio 
decisions in the foreign versus local currency denominated bonds guide the demand for 
domestic money.  Portfolio composition is influenced by hedging and speculative 
incentives.  It changes based on return differentials subject to maximizing a flow budget 
constraint.  The expected exchange rate depreciation term in the demand for domestic 
money provides a test for the presence of currency substitution.  de Freitas’s empirical 
results also suggest that in countries facing monetary instability and currency 
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substitution, restricting the availability of interest-bearing assets denominated in foreign 
currency can destabilize money demand.   
However, introducing transaction cost leads to imperfect substitutability of 
competing moneys as in Uribe (1997) and Engineer (2000).  These models use a 
“transaction technology” framework to avoid restricting money holding to one unit or 
good.  This an improvement on other currency substitution models like that of 
Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993).  This technology allows part of the market to 
use either local or foreign money in transactions.   
The Market and Institutions View and the Reemergence 
of Cost Functions 
The market-mechanism view explains financial dollarization by considering on 
market frictions, sluggishness and official barriers against currency and asset substitution. 
These factors include switching and transaction costs, network externalities, 
cash-in-advance assumption, expectational adjustment periods, the presence of multiple 
equilibria and hysteresis or irreversibility.  The focus is generally on an individual 
optimization problem that is aggregated to the macro level.  The institutional view 
emphasizes how policy can foster financial dollarization, either by introducing new 
distortions or by reinforcing the market dynamics in play.  Policies like dollar pegs, 
taxing of foreign currency transactions, confiscation of foreign currencies, liberalization 
of trade and finance (especially dual currency banking systems), and providing inflation 
indexed assets can all have serious impact on dollarization levels.   
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Another area of focus, for example in Sturzenegger (1992, 1997) and Levy-Yeyati 
(2004) work, is  
on the relationship between the rate of inflation and the degree of currency 
substitution.  On the one hand, they emphasize the direct effect the average rate of 
inflation has on currency substitution as private agents substitute out of the 
domestic currency to hedge against the erosion of its value, which intensifies 
currency substitution.  On the other hand, they stress the feedback effect of the 
degree of currency substitution on the inflation rate as the base of the inflation tax 
shrinks and a financially constrained government monetizes its budget deficit, 
which, in turn, leads to higher inflation.  (Neanidis & Savva, 2006, p. 2)  
Furthermore, the interaction of rapid money supply and currency substitution is also 
present in studies that examine the irreversibility of currency substitution.  Theoretical 
explanations of this phenomenon have mainly focused on the transaction costs involved 
in switching between two currencies when randomly matched agents have differing 
currency preferences (de Freitas & Viega, 2006; Guidotti & Rodriguez, 1991; Oomes, 
2003; Uribe, 1997).  Evidence of hysteresis has been accounted for by using a ratchet 
effect function.  This function usually depends on current and lagged inflation or 
depreciation rates as in Kamin and Ericsson (1993). 
Dollarization hysteresis can also exist due to factors such as the sizable 
transactions costs involved in switching money holdings from foreign currency back to 
domestic currency (Guidotti & Rodriguez, 1991; Uribe, 1997) or the gradual 
development of financial instruments and institutions that depends on using foreign 
currencies during sustained high-inflation episodes, which then become permanent parts 
of the landscape even after inflation subsides (Dornbusch & Reynoso, 1989; Dornbusch 
& Wolf, 1990).   
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Transaction Cost and Network Based Models 
Early transaction cost based models focused on the cost of switching back and 
forth between currencies and predicting the need for incurring such cost.  The expected 
return from switching must more than compensate for the cost of staying with a 
depreciating money brand, for example.   
Guidotti and Rodriguez (1991) built a transaction cost model with a neutral band 
for inflation; within it there is no incentive to de-dollarize.  Switching back to a domestic 
currency following dollarization will occur only if domestic inflation is low enough to 
overcome a transaction cost difference between using dollars and a domestic currency.  
This transaction cost threshold for reversing established dollar holdings is a form of 
‘ratchet effect’ of inflation on money demand.  The ratchet effect reduces money demand 
for a local currency when inflation rises, but increasing this demand by a lesser extent 
when inflation falls.  Sturzenegger (1992) extends Guidotti and Rodriguez work by 
emphasizing scale economies and financial adaptation as forces behind hysteresis effects 
driven by transactions costs.  These papers are good examples for the modeling path that 
explains dollarization through transaction cost, network externalities and hysteresis 
associated with currency use. 
One of the early efforts to understand network externality, is Farrell and Saloner’s 
(1985, 1986) papers on the effect of ‘Installed Base and Compatibility’ of various 
technological standards on competition and the introduction of new products.  Farrell and 
Saloner explained network externality as an increase in the usefulness, or value of a good 
to any user, as more users choose compatible goods.  If an installed base exists and 
transition to a new standard must be gradual (not mandated by the government,) early 
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adopters will bear higher costs than late adopters.  This can cause “excess inertia.”  If the 
transition is mandated, then delaying the conversion to the new standard may be costly.  
The high cost of procrastination can create “excess momentum” as agents attempt to 
minimize cost by adopting the new or mandated technology (see Farrell & Saloner, 1986, 
p. 940).  Farrell and Saloner’s (1985) earlier model considered only the decision to switch 
to a new technology as one time opportunity, while the 1986 paper introduces more 
flexibility allowing the participants to switch at different times.  The authors found that 
“excess inertia” can exist even under “complete information” conditions if large networks 
are present.  Large networks can have two externalities affecting a user’s adoption 
decision: the stranding or lock-in effect on the installed base that can produce negative 
returns by delaying new technology adoption, and an increasing return effect on late 
adopters that may encourage procrastination.   
Dowd and Greenaway’s (1993) modeling work represents one of the earliest 
efforts at introducing the role of agent interaction and currency network into currency 
competition literature.  The model examines currency competition and substitution with 
network externalities and switching constraint factors.  Network effect is explained as the 
increase in the value of a particular currency to a user as the number of users of that 
currency increases.  The network effect influences the agent’s decision to switch from 
one currency to another depending on his/her expectations about what other agents will 
do.  The scale of currency networks has a direct impact on the value of money holdings 
and as a consequence on people’s money demand for various currencies.  In this model, 
agents have the choice to hold only one of two currency types.  The model’s network 
externalities exhibit increasing returns under conditions of perfect foresight, where agents 
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know the currency preferences of the others.  However, the perfect foresight assumption 
leads to corner solutions.  It also does not allow a currency to be used as a store of value 
only without also being used as a medium of exchange.  The switching decision uses a 
simple utility function and produces instant corner solutions.  Money is not presumed to 
have a store of value function.  See also Dean (2000) for an expanded discussion of the 
role of transactional networks in currency competition. 
The presence of multiple equilibria that supported the co-existence of multiple 
currencies gained strong momentum with the widely cited paper of Matsuyama et al. 
(1993).  The authors employ a model of two countries with their own respective 
currencies.  Agents are randomly matched in a semi “cash-in-advance” setup, where 
agents can only trade with fiat money without requiring a particular money brand to be 
used.  Generally, random matching models assume a random process in which agents are 
matched uniformly in pairs, where the opportunity of any agent to transact with another is 
the same.  Matsuyama et al. “divide agents into two groups and assume that a pair of 
agents that belong to the same group is more likely to be matched than a pair of agents 
that belong to different groups” (p. 284).  The model demonstrates the possibility of 
multiple equilibria in the usage of the two currencies.  Agents are allowed to hold only 
one unit of one currency type per-period and to conduct one transaction with that money.  
By using discrete time periods and a transaction mechanism, equilibria are generated 
through a search based evolutionary process (see also Kiyotaki & Wright, 1993).  The 
transaction mechanism or technology is in the form of a 2 x 3 matrix of the probability 
that an agent with a particular preference set will meet another agent who is similar, 
different or meets nobody.  When one currency brand gains market share at the expense 
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of the other, those who use that currency will gain too due to the expanded network of 
users that makes transactions easier.  Economic integration between two countries is an 
important facilitator for one local currency to be used internationally and to compete with 
the local currency of other countries.   
Peiers and Wrase (1997) related currency hysteresis in Bolivian financial markets 
to network externalities.  “The probability of observing a dollar-denominated loan in a 
particular region of Bolivia is shown to be positively related to various proxies capturing 
positive network effects on agents from dollar usage” (p. 1).  Transaction cost, in the 
form of borrowing fee, increases with the size of the loan and decreases as network 
externalities for a currency increases.  Peiers and Wrase further explain this by saying “a 
network of dollar users increases the marginal cost of lending Bolivian currency and 
decreases the marginal cost of lending dollars” (p. 4).  Political credibility as a factor is 
also included in five different variables to try to isolate hysteresis from network 
externalities effects and to identify ratcheting events.  Ratcheting events are those that 
follow a shock to exchange rates that lead to a strong rise or ratcheting in the 
dollarization level of domestic financial markets and the economy at large.  Hysteresis or 
the persistence of a new higher dollarization level after a ratcheting event takes place 
when the population does not credibly trust the political will of the government in 
stabilizing the local economy.  This lack of trust can be born out of historical experience 
with the current ruling party or previous economic reform and stabilization attempts 
and/or contradictions in the current macroeconomic policies of the various authorities in 
the country.  Controlling for ratcheting and hysteresis effects can help identify the pure 
role of positive currency network externalities in gradually driving currency and asset 
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substitution levels.  Peiers and Wrase also tried to make their model more flexible by 
allowing multiple holdings of money and goods.  Households maximize utility by 
ordering their preference of consumption goods subject to their currency holdings.   
A different approach to understanding competition among international currencies 
was provided by Lyons and Moore (2005).  Their paper addresses currency competition 
from a transaction information perspective.  In traditional models, transactions do not 
convey information.  Therefore, transaction costs, the driver of competition outcomes, are 
influenced by market size.  By adding the information aspect, it is possible to understand 
currency trade patterns with the help of the concentrating force of the market.  
Transaction channel type, direct or through a vehicle, actually makes a difference in 
prices because different trading methods do not convey homogenous information.  
Finally, the model formally demonstrates a currency arbitrage process and shows that 
arbitrage transaction quantities and price levels are jointly determined.  The information 
model predicts that transactions should affect prices across markets, albeit at various 
degrees in the short run. 
Cash-In-Advance Models 
Lucas (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1987), and Svensson (1985) pioneered 
the cash-in-advance class of models.  In cash-in-advance models, there is an upper 
limit to agents’ purchases capped by the money held at the beginning of the period.  
The cash-in-advance constraint (sometimes known as the Clower  
   
32
constraint6) is used in economic theoretical development to capture monetary 
phenomena.  In the most basic economic models (such as the Walras model or the 
Arrow-Debreu model) there is no role for money.  These models are not sufficiently 
detailed to consider how people pay for goods.  To be able to say anything about the 
money supply, inflation monetary policy and so on, the cash-in-advance constraint is 
used.  This assumption requires each consumer or firm to have sufficient cash available 
before they can buy goods.  This assumption also justifies the medium of exchange role 
of monetary assets.  Hellwig (2000) explains that  
all agents trade twice to acquire what they want to consume: once to obtain the 
medium of exchange (sell their production), and once to buy their consumption 
good.  Effectively, a cash-in-Advance constraint for transactions with 
intermediaries is introduced, i.e., market participants have to use the common 
medium of exchange to be able to trade with intermediaries.  (p. 4) 
It can be regarded as an extreme special case of the shopping-time approach, where extra 
consumption through shopping is possible but increasingly expensive in terms of time or 
other resources (McCallum & Goodfriend, 1986).  Cash-in-advance models provide a 
conducive framework to discuss network, transaction cost and hysteresis factors.   
Uribe’s (1997) cash-in-advance model with network externality and hysteresis 
effects provide an important foundation to much of the research work that followed, 
including that of Oomes (2003).  A unique twist is Uribe’s modeling of hysteresis as a 
human experience factor with a currency that can be slowly accumulated and lost 
overtime.  The cost of buying goods with a foreign currency is decreasing in the 
                                                 
6 After economist Robert Clower (1965) who suggested an evolutionary mechanism until “goods 
buy money and money buys goods, but goods don’t buy goods” (p. 6). 
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economy’s accumulated experience in transacting in the foreign currency.  This 
experience is shown to display hysteresis in money velocity, that is, a temporary increase 
in expected inflation can cause a permanent increase in velocity.  In addition, the model 
implies that the domestic currency does not have to dominate the foreign currency in rate 
of return to induce agents to stop using the foreign currency.  Finally, inflation rates that 
trigger currency substitution need not be associated with steady states in which the 
domestic currency disappears from circulation.  More than one brand of money can 
coexist in a persistent equilibrium.  Uribe’s model demonstrates the role of learning by 
doing in currency substitution.  He uses a law of motion for the accumulated experience 
of agents with the foreign currency, which can also depreciate if not used.  A human 
experience factor is not easy to quantify in empirical models, but the law of motion part 
of it turned out to be useful in Oomes’ (2003) work. 
In an extensive empirical study of the spread and persistence of dollarization, 
Kamin and Ericsson (1993) focused on macroeconomic factors, such as domestic 
inflation as well as behavioral factors.  Agents’ learning to transact in a new currency and 
their use of banking services for transactions, just as in Uribe’s model discussion above, 
were found to be instrumental in driving dollarization.  Of particular interest is their 
discussion of hysteresis and menu cost problems in transition between different 
currencies.  They found, for example, that the maximum past domestic inflation rate 
affects its expected future value.  This relationship between past and future inflation rates 
was found to have a statistically significant “ratchet” effect on dollarization.  The larger 
the maximum past inflation, the more likely it is for dollarization to persist.  This is 
explained partially by the lack of timely and cheap information about inflation adjusted 
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nominal interested rates (real Interest rates) on Peso deposits.  The authors also found that 
using past maximum depreciation rates as ratchet variables worked well in predicting 
hysteresis outcomes.  But realizing that a total irreversibility of dollarization is not very 
realistic, the authors expanded their model to include prices, interest rates on bank 
deposits and savings, exchange rates and dollar holding in the banking sector.   
Another variation of the cash-in-advance class of models was provided by 
Engineer (2000).  Again in Engineer’s model two competing fiat currencies, domestic 
and foreign, may coexist as media of exchange.  Unlike in Uribe and Oomes’ models, 
agents are allowed multiple holdings of money and goods along with a stochastic 
consumption demand, and high and low uncertainty levels in forming expectations.  The 
domestic currency has lower transaction cost but a higher growth rate than the foreign 
currency.  This currency is used in everyday transactions and has a higher velocity of 
circulation at equilibrium.  In contrast, the foreign currency is hoarded for occasional 
high consumption shocks and precautionary consumption.  It has high transaction cost 
but considered a strong store of value and thus used for occasional large purchases.  The 
different endogenous roles for the currencies provide an explanation for the 
nondisappearance of the hyperinflating domestic currency in the presence of a stable 
foreign currency.   
Money specialization leads to nonsubstitution, which is useful for analyzing 
hysteresis and defacto optimal/maximum saturation levels of dollarization.  Though the 
presence of the foreign currency lowers the value of the domestic currency, it may 
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increase welfare when large amount of seigniorage7 is to be generated.  The foreign 
currency’s transaction cost is assumed to increase as the size of its network increases.  
Despite the unrealistic nature of this assumption, Engineer makes this compromise to 
keep his model internally consistent.  The increasing circulation of a currency is 
accompanied by decreasing transaction cost, thus the expanding network of users produce 
positive spillover benefit. 
Camera, Craig, and Waller (2004) use two factors--currency risk and trade 
frictions--to model how fiat currencies compete in an open market and obtain equilibrium 
values.  Agents look at the utility they derive from spending one currency versus another.  
The risk involved is that of sudden confiscation of the local currency via inflationary 
measures, while the foreign currency is assumed to be free of such risk.  The category of 
agents who hold both local and foreign money need to decide which money to spend first, 
given the risk involved and the expected utility that can be generated over time.  Agents 
prefer to transact in the safe currency, unless trade frictions and the currency risk are low.  
Trade friction is also dependent on the risk factor without specifying an interaction 
function.  As the relative risk of two currencies changes, their values also change leading 
to market price disturbances.  Buyers’ spending strategies are affected by price 
disturbances to the effect of altering economy-wide transaction patterns and the relative 
transaction velocities of the currencies.   
                                                 
7 Seigniorage can be defined as the real return on printing money. 
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Camera et al. (2004) find that dollarization threat is more serious to poorly 
functioning economies with risky currencies.  They conclude by stating that “our analysis 
is consistent with the view that the local currency sustains internal trade if the purchasing 
power risk is kept very low, but once that risk gets too high substantial currency 
substitution kicks in” (p. 542). 
Feige et al. (2003) who employ Oomes’ modeling approach in their paper also 
note the impact of hyperinflations and severe exchange rate depreciations in radically 
reducing the rates of return on local domestic currencies relative to U.S. dollars.  Under 
falling local currencies’ purchasing power, individuals flee to the perceived safety of the 
dollar or other strong foreign currencies.  Asset substitution is usually the primary motive 
to avoid the costs of a depreciating store of value.  However, currency also represents an 
important medium of exchange, and the extent of currency substitution depends upon the 
relative transaction costs of foreign and local currency.   
Relative transaction costs are, in turn, determined by the network externalities 
enjoyed by the users of each alternative medium of exchange and the costs of switching 
between them.  For any expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, it is more 
likely that agents will substitute into a foreign currency if other agents already use it as a 
co-circulating medium of exchange in the domestic economy.  When severe exchange 
rate depreciation induces unofficial dollarization, network externalities tend to reinforce 
the rewards of holding the stronger currency.  Switching costs inhibit a return to the local 
currency even after a successful stabilization effort.  “These well known incentive effects 
give rise to the conjecture that once de facto dollarization has reached a threshold, it may 
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well persist, leading to the observation of dollarization hysteresis” (Feige et al., 2003, 
p. 12). 
Present Work and Future Extensions 
Oomes’ model can be regarded as a representation of an augmented 
cash-in-advance model by including network effects, and served as the foundation of my 
work.  One important feature in Oomes’ paper is the use of a logistical function to model 
a more realistic depiction of network effects and switching cost.  This function also 
provides a mechanism that slows asset substitution at the extreme.  Brock and Durlauf’s 
(2001) suggestion that there are positive complementarities in joining a network made 
this crucial feature in Oomes’ model possible.   
David and Greenstein’s (1990) work on the nature of industrial standards 
competition contained some interesting explanation of the dynamics of network 
externalities, especially what they termed the “bandwagon effect” (p. 7).  Their 
discussion was beneficial in providing theoretical support to Oomes’ work and the 
present work.8  Further examination of both Oomes’ model, and David and Greenstein’s 
insights will be presented later as part of discussion of the theoretical approach of my 
work. 
                                                 
8 Also, among the new exciting possibilities is the application of the network approach in currency 
substitution to other fields of research.  Network effects can improve the understanding of the substitution 




In the area of currency competition, asset substitution refers specifically to the 
competition between local and foreign currencies (pesos versus dollars) over fulfilling the 
store of value function for money users.  Currency substitution models, on the other hand, 
focus on how currencies compete to fulfill the medium of exchange function.  The model 
I present takes into consideration both types of substitution by considering two types of 
costs associated with the holding and the use of money.  These factors, under the right 
circumstances and functional form, produce network dynamics that favors one currency 
over another in a path determined fashion and persistent dollarization or hysteresis.9  This 
section provides a literature discussion of these factors and ties this discussion with the 
model I present formally afterward. 
As stated above, cost factors are of two types, holding cost and transaction cost.  
Holding cost captures the impact of peso’s diminishing purchasing power, especially 
when it is held or saved for a long time.  The holding cost to individuals or firms that rely 
                                                 
9 Hysteresis is not a true theoretical explanation, rather an observed outcome that the model 
explains. 
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heavily on the store of value quality of a currency is higher versus those who carry only 
short-term transactional balances.  The loss is positively related to peso’s depreciation 
rate, and the size and the length of time a stock of pesos is held.  According to Edmunds 
and Marthinsen (2003), agents experiencing hyperinflation may willingly keep on using 
small amounts of the local currency in daily purchases.  However, the holding cost of a 
large amount of such currency may be too much to bear for some agents.  Agents 
experiencing frequent hyperinflation episodes can adapt by converting their savings into 
safer stores of value, be it gold, dollars or Euros (see also Melvin, 1988).  While a 
decision to convert savings into a safer asset may help protect against purchasing power 
losses, it also may make it inconvenient to make purchases later if the safer assets cannot 
easily be used for transactional purposes. 
Transaction cost looks at the economic burden associated with moving money 
between two different denominations to pay for products and services.  This cost exists 
whenever the preferences of buyers and sellers to transact with a certain brand of money 
differ.  In other words, there is a cost when transacting parties belong to different 
transactional networks.  In these instances, a transaction must also include the cost of 
converting currency from one denomination to another.  In general, belonging to a 
network produces external gain to its members.  The gain is in the form of savings on 
currency switching cost.  The gain increases as the size of the currency network expands 
and so does the opportunity cost of opting out.  Network externalities influence is 
strongest on agents who place more weight on the transaction cost of a currency, which is 
a function of other agents’ choice to dollarize or not.  Brock and Durlauf (2001) argue 
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that thanks to external effects “payoff for a particular action is higher for one agent when 
others behave similarly” (p. 235). 
New in my research is the use of the “bandwagon effect,” from industrial standard 
rivalry literature, to lend stronger theoretical support to the network and cost factors in 
the model.  David and Greenstein (1990) describes the bandwagon effect as “the 
processes by which decision makers overcome coordination problems in planning how to 
adopt a new standard, starting with those with largest private gain to those with largest 
network gains” (p. 7).  In the context of this dissertation, the bandwagon effect suggests 
that those who have the highest prospect of loss due to private holding cost consideration 
will be the first to dollarize their savings.  Those who do so later are motivated mainly by 
the size of the dollar’s transactional network.  Thus, under the right conditions of holding 
and transaction cost, there is a strong path-dependence element in the wide circulation of 
international money brands like the dollar, Euro and yen (see also Bergsten, 2002; 
Eichengreen, 2005; Greenspan, 2001; Jameson, 2003; Matsuyama et al., 1993; Ritter & 
Rowe, 2000).  Furthermore, the expansion or contraction of a network is not an 
open-ended process.  Network size tends to stabilize as Brock and Durlauf (2001) 
explain: 
the presence of social interaction will induce a tendency for conformity in 
behavior across members of a reference group.  When social interactions act as 
strategic complementarities between agents, multiple equilibria may occur in 
absence of any coordination mechanism.  (p. 235) 
Oomes’ (2003) currency substitution model and the Feige et al. (2003) minor variation 
and application of the same model provide the underpinnings of the mechanism and 
econometric methodology for this dissertation.  However, in order to analyze asset 
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substitution problems, Oomes’ framework was modified to admit multiple economic 
sectors, financial intermediation and different timing sequence to assure alignment 
between assumption and conclusions at the theory level.  The model itself was enhanced 
by adding an interest rate differential variable and a radically different switching cost 
function to better reflect the constraints on deposit accounts and the behavior of 
switching cost as dollarization increases.  The result is an Oomes’ model variation that is 
theoretically and empirically adapted to analyze deposit dollarization case studies.  The 
rest of this section will explain the above in more detail. 
This chapter will present a model of currency substitution.  The following section 
will discuss the model’s foundation, assumptions, best response equations and theoretical 
treatments that enable the model to address network effects and hysteresis in currency 
competition.  The next section discusses the expected values in the model and produces 
an econometrically estimable equation.  This equation is tested on the case studies in 
Chapter 3.   
Cost Functions 
In Oomes’ (2003) currency substitution model, the starting point is a group of 
general assumptions to build a cash-in-advance framework.  Seller and buyer agents 
decide to hold either a local or a foreign currency today according to the expected cost 
associated with each currency.  By combining the cost equations, buyers and sellers face 
a cost minimization constraint.   
A major departure from Oomes’ model is replacing the seller and buyer categories 
with agents being either in the domestic or the foreign currency network.  There is also 
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no need to use three time periods to build the model, during which a buyer at time t-1 
becomes a seller at time t and again a buyer at time t+1.  A buyer at time t+1 uses his 
previous buying experience at time t-1 to form his expectations and currency preference 
at time t+1.  The model developed here does not require multiple time periods.  An 
agent’s currency preference, just as in Oomes’ model, is based on expectations about the 
network value (the choices of other agents) and the holding cost (personal utility) of 
various currencies today (t) rather than tomorrow (t+1).   
Oomes’ cash-in-advance assumption has been relaxed to allow agents to hold 
different amounts of cash and own different amounts of a homogenous product.  Since 
network size influences currency preferences of all agents, key market players (large 
currency holders/users) are allowed to have a bigger role in the model presented in this 
dissertation.  It also helps justify the use of a logistic function in combination with the 
bandwagon effect to explain why certain agents may decide to dollarize ahead of others 
due to putting different weights on the holding and transacting costs.10  However, agents 
still need to have money in advance and to make decisions regarding denomination of 
their currency holdings.  As in a typical cash-in-advance model, agents are also restricted 
to conducting one transaction per period (see Dowd & Greenaway, 1993; Matsuyama et 
al., 1993). 
There are two currency networks, one for the local (peso) currency and one for 
the foreign (dollar) currency.  An agent can hold only one kind of currency at any time.  
                                                 
10 The empirical testing did not differentiate between various agents.  The “bandwagon effect” is 
used as a useful theoretical explanation of the behavior of various agents.   
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If an agent decides to hold his money in pesos it automatically becomes part of the peso 
currency network.  In a similar manner, if an agent decides to hold dollars, he/she will 
automatically become part of the dollar network.  Belonging to a network is beneficial 
when both sellers and buyers prefer to transact in the same money brand and thus avoid 
switching costs.11  
At time t agents form expectations about the cost of holding and transacting pesos 
versus dollars.  Agents expect that the purchasing power of their currency holdings to 
deteriorate by the rate of inflation in prices of goods and services denominated in pesos 
or dollars.  Inflation is a real concern for agents as it directly impacts their wellbeing and 
future consumption ability.   
Countering the inflation cost, money holdings at financial institutions (banks) 
earn a nominal interest rate of (it ) and ( *ti ), on domestic and dollar deposits respectively 
at time t.  Agents also assess the benefit of transacting with various currencies by looking 
at the cost of switching ( tσ ) from one to another.  The chance of incurring a switching 
cost depends on the dollarization ratio ( tp ) in the economy at time t.  The dollarization 
                                                 
11 One kind of transaction cost that was dropped from the model developed in this dissertation and 
was in Oomes’ paper is Institutional barriers.  Institutional barriers, like regulations, taxes and fees, can 
increase the cost of transacting in foreign currencies.  Dollar holdings can face an institutional cost q if used 
in transactions or face other institutional or market barriers when shopping at small or remote markets 
where the dollar is less familiar and harder to exchange.  Oomes used a foreign exchange fee imposed on 
switching from Russian Rubles to U.S. Dollars to represent this transaction cost.  In the case studies of 
Argentina and Bolivia, which this research presents, data on such cost were not available and therefore it 
was dropped from the model.  Institutional and market barriers are similar to the presence of barriers 
against entry and exit into industries and in adopting a technology standard in industrial organization 
literature.  A decrease in these barriers is key to creating contestable markets, where monopolist or 
oligopolist firms price like perfect competitors for fear of market share loss due to ease of entry and exit by 
opportunistic entrepreneurs or currency arbitrage by typical agents. 
   
44
ratio stands for percentage of agents choosing to hold dollars at time t.  Even though 
different agents may belong to different currency networks, their chance of transacting 
with agents of a different network is equal to that network’s share of the market, as 
represented by tp .
12  The product of multiplying the switching cost factor by the 
probability of transacting with another dollar holding agent ( tt pσ ) then becomes the 
expected switching cost for peso holders at time t. 
At time t-1, agents form expectations about the inflation rates on peso and dollar 
denominated prices by looking at the peso’s and dollar’s depreciation rates ( *ˆ,ˆ tt ee ), 
interest rates on peso and dollar deposits ( *ˆ,ˆ tt ii ), and the switching cost ( tσˆ ) at time t.   
The expected cost of holding and transacting with pesos c(mt), at time t becomes: 
 ttttt piemc ˆˆ ˆˆ)( σ+−=  (1) 
And the expected cost for dollar users, c (mt*), becomes: 
 )ˆ1(ˆ 
ˆˆ)( *** ttttt piemc −+−= σ  (2) 
                                                 
12 One way to improve the model is to change the probability of agents having to transact out of 
their network from being proportional to the size of the network to having a higher probability to transact 
within one’s chosen network.  Agents in the second scenario can be assumed to belong to different 
economic sectors like financial versus agricultural, or urban versus rural markets, etc.  Agents in a specific 
sector have a higher probability to transact with each other than with agents in other sectors, without 
precluding the chance for an intrasector transaction taking place.   
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Cost minimizing agents will hold dollars whenever c (mt*) < c (mt) and will hold 
pesos if the inequality is reversed.  There is still a possibility that agents may continue to 
prefer a currency for noneconomic considerations that are observable to them only.13  Let 
* and tt εε  represent these unaccounted and unobserved random utility (or disutility) 
factors influencing the currency preferences of agents.  * and tt εε  influence the decision 
to hold pesos or dollars respectively by an agent at time t.14  To arrive at the final form of 
the model and to produce S shaped curves, φ is introduced as a coefficient of * and tt εε .15  
Now we can state the probability (pt) that a given agent will hold dollars at time t to be 
 }   + )(m c  <  )(m c {Pr   t
**
t tttp εϕεϕ   +=   
 )]}ˆ1(ˆ 
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ[{ Pr *** tttttttttt piepie −−+−+−<−= σσϕεϕε  
 ]}ˆˆ2ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ[{ Pr **1* ttttttttt piiee σσεε ϕ +−−+−<−=  (3) 
If we assume that agents know * and tt εε  at time t, and that these random factors 
are identically and independently distributed (idd) then the difference in * and tt εε  can be  
                                                 
13 Agents may hold pesos because of patriotic sentiment, believe the economy will improve soon, 
or want to comply with laws that prohibit transacting in foreign currencies among other reasons.   
14 Feige et al. (2003) explain that “In order to close the model and introduce a stochastic element 
that allows for noncorner solutions, Oomes uses the random utility terms * and tt εε that account for 
unobserved variables effecting the cost or benefits of holding domestic and foreign currency” (p. 60). 
15 Brock and Durlauf (2001) developed φ as a coefficient that measures the overall role of 
* and tt εε  on the total expected cost.  The term φ also incorporates the effect of social interaction and 
interdependencies of agents’ decision.  This term is used in this dissertation to easily arrive at the final form 
of the model without departing too much from the literature, which this model is based on.  It probably can 
be simplified by including φ in * and tt εε in future refinements. 
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assumed to be logistically distributed in the following manner:16 
 If, x = ]ˆˆ2ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ[ ** ttttttt piiee σσ +−−+−  
  and, Pr (ε* – ε < x) = [1 + exp (– φ x )]-1 (4) 
  Then, pt = Pr (ε* – ε < x) = [1 + exp (– φ x )]-1 
  or, pt = [1 + exp (– φ x )]-1 (5) 
Brock and Durlauf (2001) use the logistic transformation in Equation 5 to create 
“a direct link between the theoretical model and its econometric implementation” 
(p. 239).  This transformation into logistic distribution is instrumental in depicting the 
observed excess inertia and excess momentum that characterize currency competition.  
This behavior is sometimes termed as the “bandwagon effect”17 described earlier.    
The model becomes econometrically estimable when the standard discrete choice 
theory18 is applied to Equation 5.  The theory helps generate the following equation to 
describe the discrete choice of dollarizing. 
                                                 
16 See Appendix B for further information on the probability and cumulative density functions of 
logistic distribution. 
17 Agents in different economic sectors may put varying values on the different cost components 
of the currencies they hold and use or plan to.  Export and financial sectors may convert to a safer currency 
because they put a higher value on the stability of a currency.  This stability is crucial for fulfilling 
long-term obligations or dollar denominated obligations as in foreign currency denominated liabilities.  
These type of agents will be among the early adopters of the safer currency regardless of what other local 
agents decide to do.  Other agents at the local retail level may find it more convenient to hold and transact 
in a currency that their customers are paid in and are familiar with its look and purchasing power.  These 
agents will adopt the safer currency only after enough agents have done so to justify the transaction costs 
involved. 
18 The theory uses a qualitative response model where the dependent variable is an indicator of a 
discrete choice, such as yes or no.  In our case it is pesos or dollars (see Greene, 2003 for discussion on 
random utility models). 
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1**1 ]})ˆˆ2ˆˆˆˆˆ[exp{1( −+−−+−−+= tttttttt piieep σσϕ  (6) 
Equation 6 contains the following important properties: The probability that a 
typical agent will choose to save dollars, given expected dollarization levels tpˆ , increases 
with the increase in expected inflation teˆ , a decrease in dollar’s inflation 
*
tˆe , and the gap 
between tt ii ˆˆ
* − .19  
Interestingly, tσˆ ‘s influence changes depending on the value of tpˆ .  If the 
expected dollarization ratio at (t) is relatively low, an increase in expected switching cost 
tσˆ will depress dollarization levels today pt.  If on the other hand tpˆ  is relatively high, an 
increase in switching cost will encourage more agents to dollarize their money holdings.  
This happens because all agents are exposed to incurring transaction costs.  However, the 
burden of this cost varies between the members of the two currency networks (the peso 
and the dollar) according to their sizes or the probability of having to transact within the 
network.  So, when the dollar network is small, dollar holdings are more exposed to a 
transaction cost premium than peso holding and vice versa when the dollar network is 
large.20  This behavioral pattern preserves the status quo, i.e., to keep agents in the peso 
                                                 
19 The longer a stock of pesos is held (n time periods) and the higher the rate of depreciation is, the 
higher its holding cost.  tt ii ˆˆ
* −  is expected to be a negative sum since rates of return on local currencies 
usually add a country risk premium.  Thus, larger negative tt ii ˆˆ
* −  sums should lessen pesos account losses 
or make peso accounts more attractive and vice versa.   
20 This can impose market inefficiency due to the difficulty of coordinating agents’ decision 
making process to arrive at a socially optimal outcome.  This may justify the involvement of a 
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network when the peso is dominant and in the dollar network when it is dominant, thus 
producing hysteresis.  This hysteresis outcome also captures the “bandwagon effect” of 
the agents who are more concerned about transaction costs rather than holding costs and 
thus are not interested in switching back.  These agents hesitate to convert from one 
network to another, unless they can see obvious return. 
Appendix C demonstrates, through simulations, the impact of manipulating the 
various parameters in Equation 6 and how the dollarization paths can change dramatically 
in response.  The simulations in Appendix C are very useful in understanding what range 
of values can produce multiple dollarization equilibria and which ones do not. 
Expectations and Functional Forms 
From the above analysis, agents’ currency choices are found to depend on the 
expected values of )ˆ and ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ,ˆ( ** tttttt piiee σ− .  Also a functional form that is theoretically 
sound and lends itself to econometric estimation is needed for some of these variables.  
These issues are the subject of this section. 
Starting with tpˆ , buyers can predict that dollarization level today to be similar to 
the one they experienced in their last shopping trip or last period (i-1), so 1ˆ −= tt pp .  “This 
assumption is considered reasonable in cases where agents repeatedly encounter similar 
situations” (Oomes, 2003, p. 16).  With a sufficiently large pool of agents, pt or the 
                                                                                                                                                 
governmental entity to make a decision whether to dollarize or not, or to adopt a new technological 
standard or not as the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) mandated the full conversion of TV 
broadcasting from analog to digital signal transmission.  
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overall dollarization ratio at time t is equal to the probability that a random agent is 
holding dollars at time t.  
Second, the same assumption above will be used with )ˆˆ( * tt ii −  so we have 
)( 1
*
1 −− − tt ii .  In calculating the reward from holding a currency, agents look at the nominal 
interest rate paid on deposits in that currency in the previous time period (i-1).  Citizens 
in financially vulnerable economies “frequently require extra compensation to voluntarily 
hold their own money in deposit because they view it as an inferior brand” (von 
Furstenberg, 2000, p. 21).  Just paying interest rates on peso deposits may not be enough 
to convince people to let go from the safety of dollarized savings.   
Third, switching cost ( tσˆ ) from one currency to another21 will be assumed to 
depend on the dollarization level in the economy and to have a convex parabolic shape:22 
 ( ) ( ) 21414ˆ 12 1 +−+−−= −− ttt pp γγσ  (7) 
where, 0 < γ  < 1. 
                                                 
21 Good and well documented data on switching or transaction costs or a proxy for such costs are 
hard to find in general. 
22 Oomes (2003) assumed that switching cost ( tσˆ ) to depend on the prevailing dollarization level 
in the economy.  The increasing demand for dollars encourages more foreign exchange kiosks and 
businesses to open, which will increase competition and reduce switching costs from pesos to dollars.  The 
functional form she suggested as a proxy for switching cost is: 1 1 −−= tt pγσ .  In this formulation, 
switching cost is at its highest when the dollarization ratio ( 1−tp ) at its lowest.  Feige et al. (2003) used a 
slight variation of Oomes’ switching cost function by specifying an intercept that will be estimated 
empirically.  Their form is 1211 −+ −= tt pγγσ .   
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In Equation 7, σt represent a switching cost index.  Equation 7 implies that when 
dollar holdings at zero or at a maximum (pt-1 = 0 or 1), the transactional cost index will be 
at its highest where (σ = 2).  The switching cost index will be at its lowest when pt-1 = 0.5 
and the final value of index will depend on γ.  Equation 7 suggests when there is a 
dominant currency it is costly to transact with a rival currency and when rival currencies 
share the market equally, the transaction cost will be the same for all currency holders.23 
Fourth, expectations about peso’s depreciation can be the product of a number of 
factors.  Using the “expectational adjustment periods” approach,24 agents will be 
assumed to predict peso’s depreciation rate at time t by referring to the peso’s 
depreciation rate at time t-1 and also its highest depreciation rate in the recent past.  By 
referring to the peso’s highest depreciation rate in the recent past, indicates a ratchet 
effect.  The ratchet effect captures the impact of previous strong depreciation episodes, 
which led to strong purchasing power loses.  The expected rate of peso’s depreciation is 
assumed to be 
 
max
1 )1( ˆ nttt eee −− −+= αα  (8) 
where, 0 < α  < 1. 
                                                 
23 The credit for devising this function goes to David Kiefer.   
24 This approach stands for the realization that it takes time before agents become convinced that a 
present macroeconomic stability is of permanent nature (see Oomes, 2003; Peires & Wrase, 1997).  Other 
explanations incorporate transaction and learning cost. 
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1−te  is the depreciation rate in the previous period.  },...,max{ 21
max
ntttnt eeee −−−− =  is 
the highest depreciation rate in the previous n periods and it is the source of ratcheting 
effect in the model.25  Agents expect with a probability α that the depreciation rate this 
period will be equal to 1−te  and with a probability of )1( α− expect the depreciation rate 
to equal maxnte − .  The foreign currency is assumed to be a stable bench mark for value.  
Therefore, *tˆe  = 0.   
After doing the required substitutions to Equation 6, we arrive at specifying the 
following law of motion:26 
 
( ) ( )























Equation 9 permits us to predict how the dollarization of assets will evolve over a 




1 −−−−− − tttntt piiee .  If 
these principal variables remain unchanged, the dollarization ratio of asset will converge 
to a steady state p* that solves pt = pt– 1 for all t.  This also indicates that changes to 
                                                 
25 Oomes’ (2003) equation is max)-(1  ˆ ttt eee αα += .  Using the current depreciation rate in the 
equation raises issues of the presence dependent variable endogeniety.  Endogeniety bias exists when your 
dependent variable and independent variable move in the same direction causing multicollinearity problem.  
Feige et al. (2003) explains Oomes’ formula by saying “expectation formation is assumed to be a linear 
combination of perfect foresight and the ratchet effect” (p. 60).   
26 Oomes’ equation is pt = (1 + exp {_ 1/φ [et – σt + (2σ + τt - qt) pt-1]})-1.  In this equation, qt 
stands for the risk of confiscation of a foreign currency if used in transactions and τt stands for a 
government tax on switching a local currency into a foreign one. 
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1 −−−−− − tttntt piiee will alter the asset substitution equilibrium as well.  In this 
modification of Oomes’ model we can also experiment with different values for the 
above variables to examine their impact on deposit dollarization equilibrium in an 
economy, as was done in the introduction.   
Econometric Equation 
The above logistic structural form equation of the model can be linearized by 
logistic manipulation in the following manner:  
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to produce the linearized model below: 
 
( ) ( )







































p1ln , the log 
odds ratio range of values is not restricted.   
To estimate the principal parameters (φ, α and γ in Equation 10) of the model 
directly a nonlinear regression method is used with the two case studies in this research. 
 Restrictions were imposed on the values of α and γ to confirm these parameters to their 
expected values (between 0 and 1).  Finally, in Equation 8, max1 )1( ˆ nttt eee −− −+= αα , a 
 maximum lag will be set to six,27 se we have },,,,,max{ 654321
max
6 −−−−−−− = ttttttt eeeeeee .
                                                 
27 The ratchet effect max6−te was chosen through an experimental process in which a range of 
lengths ( 8...
max
2−te ) were tested.  The 
max
6−te was chosen because it had a good model fit (highest R-Square 
results) and produced significant parameters in the expected ranges of values in both of Argentina’s and 
Bolivia’s case studies.  The nonlinear regression results of the experimental process can be found in 
Appendix A for Bolivia and Appendix D for Argentina. 
CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES: ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA 
The Dollarization Phenomenon 
Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, neither fixed nor flexible 
exchange regimes have saved third world countries from experiencing severe financial 
upheavals.  Rennhack and Nozaki (2006) narrates how: 
inflation in many Latin American countries during the period 1980-1995 was 
extremely high by historical standards and compared with other developing 
country regions.  In the period 1980-2003, there were a total of 56 so-called 
free-fall events--defined as years when broad money or consumer prices rose or 
the currency depreciated by over 1,000% or when deposit or lending interest rates 
exceeded 100%.  Three fourths of these events occurred in six Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay).  (p. 5) 
Among the usually cited culprits behind these upheavals are balance of payment 
crises, inflationary finances, and contagious crises (see Krugman, 1993; Salvatore, Dean, 
& Willett, 2003).  The common outcome of these two trouble filled decades was the 
emergence of the U.S. dollar as a global monetary standard.  According to Jameson 
(2001, 2003), Latin America has been a dollar bloc since the 1970s.  Ezrati (2004) and 
McKinnon (2000) considered Asia also as a dollar bloc and the U.S. currency as the 
foremost global monetary standard with the exception of the Euro area and its periphery.  
Latin America and Asia are considered dollar blocks because of the formal or informal 
exchange rate links between the individual currencies in the region and the dollar.   
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Financial dollarization, the dollarization of financial assets and liabilities, was 
also strongly encouraged by the globalization and liberalization of trade and finance (Ize 
& Levy-Yeyati, 1998).  Since the United States is the main trading partner of most Latin 
American countries, the U.S. dollar is extensively used for international transactions, 
intra-South American trade (Latin America Research Group [LARG], 2005).  
Domestically, foreign currencies served as a portfolio diversification tool in the absence 
of other financial options (Havrylyshyn & Beddies, 2003; see also Baliño, Adam, & 
Eduardo, 1999).  In this regard, conversion of assets to dollars helps hedge against a 
shaky exchange rate peg or expansionary monetary policies.  However, this financial 
dollarization of assets and liabilities was a main factor behind dollarizing local trade and 
transactions.   
Lack of trust in the future value of local currencies is often the most powerful 
driver of the extensive dollarization, as Singh et al. (2005) observe in Latin America (see 
also Cesarano, 1999; Feige et al., 2003; Melvin, 1988, for their observations in other 
parts of the world).  A legacy of severe economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s destroyed 
confidence in economic policies and in holding savings in domestic currencies.  In many 
instances “interest rates on deposits in domestic currency were unable to compensate 
depositors for inflation, leading to significant losses on savings held in domestic 
currency” (Singh et al., 2005, p. 80).  Under these circumstances, citizens often required 
extra compensation to hold local money because they viewed it as an inferior brand.  
Even after inflation declines, suspicion of another sudden inflation bout can persist and 
the credibility of monetary policy to fight inflation may remain questionable.  Under 
these circumstances, residents respond by converting their local currency deposits into 
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foreign currency deposits to protect their purchasing power, measured in local currency, 
from the risk of an unexpected inflation episode.  This fear is often reflected in 
witnessing yield curves in the six most dollarized South American countries in 2004, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and Costa Rica.  In these countries, the premium 
return on domestic over foreign currency deposits was in excess of inflation differentials.  
This excess reflects the presence of a country risk premium that local currency depositors 
need to be compensated for (Rennhack & Nozaki, 2006).   
In early 2002, financial dollarization increased substantially over their levels in 
the 1990s in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.  
Dollar bank deposits and loans accounted for at least 40%, and in extreme cases more 
than 90%, of total loans and deposits (Singh et al., 2005).   
Institutional and regulatory policies of local financial markets can also play a 
strong role to encourage or discourage dollarization.  Governments often accept or 
encourage dollarization in the hope of remonetizing the economy after a crisis, 
accelerating financial development, and/or reversing capital flight (Savastano, 1996).  
Uruguay encouraged foreign currency deposit holdings as part of its efforts to promote 
the country as a regional financial center (Singh et al., 2005).  Implicit guarantees for 
foreign deposits (Burnside, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 1999), foreign exchange pegs (de la 
Torre, Levy-Yeyati, & Schmukler, 2002, 2003) and currency-blind regulation and safety 
nets (Broda & Levy-Yeyati, 2003a, 2003b) all, expectedly or not, promoted currency and 
asset substation.   
The resulting structure of the banking system became more conducive to financial 
dollarization of domestic markets.  Prior to this, the credit market used to be segmented 
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into large, high-quality firms with their own access to credit lines abroad and other 
borrowers (such as households and medium-sized and small enterprises) without such 
access.  The use of the dollar increased efficiency from a micro perspective as it 
enhanced liquidity or generated greater efficiency in financial intermediation (Ize & 
Powell, 2004; see also Claasson & Martinez, 1994; von Furstenberg, 2001).  Financial 
liberalization allowed more competition in the domestic banking market as banks started 
lending in foreign currency not only to high-quality firms but also to small firms and 
consumers.  Another motive behind this expansion of dollar based credit is the alignment 
of the increasing share of bank liabilities denominated in foreign currency deposits with 
consumer and business loans that are denominated similarly (Catão & Terrones, 2000).  
This alignment is important for gauging banks’ default exposure, managing their balance 
sheets or to just comply with bank regulations.  All the highly dollarized economies of 
South America apply the same capital adequacy requirement to foreign and local 
currency assets and extend the same deposit insurance coverage to all deposits, regardless 
of currency denomination.  Limitations on banks’ net position in foreign exchange, and 
restrictions on the net long positions in foreign currency can also be a strong incentive to 
lend in foreign currency terms (Rennhack & Nozaki, 2006). 
Faced with desperate economic challenges, governments may resort to abrupt 
change of rules, like the freezing of foreign deposits or even their forced conversion into 
local money at an exchange rate of their choice.  For example, in August 1982 Mexico’s 
government froze all dollar denominated deposits and nationalized all banks (Melvin, 
1988).  Or, governments can declare officially the adoption of the U.S. dollar as the 
official de-jure currency of the country, as El Salvador and Ecuador did in 2000 and 2001 
   
58
respectively (Singh et al., 2005).  Yet, another option can be to reaffirm trust in the 
national currency through various forms of credible and binding commitments by passing 
laws to protect the long term purchasing power of the local currencies, increase the 
independence of the central bank and its control over money supply and by bringing in 
international supervision to certify and monitor a government’s commitment to a stable 
currency exchange rate.  The first empirical case study of Argentina showcases the range 
of currency stabilization policies that successive governments have undertaken and the 
impact of these policies on the dollarization of its economy. 
Argentina’s Case Study 
Argentina’s dollarization history can be traced back to its inflation experience 
beginning in the mid-1970s.  Annual rates of inflation of more than 100% became the 
norm in the late 1970s while the 1980s and 1990s yielded several hyperinflation episodes.  
It was common for the consumer price index in the early 1980s to rise at 20 to 40% per 
month.  This trend abated somewhat in 1985 when Alfonso’s government implemented 
the Austral plan that succeeded in controlling inflation by the end of that year.  However, 
inflation rose steadily and in 1989, the inflation rate peaked at 190% per month.  After a 
brief slowdown, inflation accelerated again to about 90% per month in 1990.  In 1989 
bank deposits were frozen as it was done in 1982 (Collyns & Kincaid, 2003).  The 
government had, effectively, confiscated part of the savings of bank depositors to finance 
its expenses. 
When Carlos Menem was first elected president of Argentina in May 1989, the 
inflation rate was running at 78% per month.  To put an end to the vicious effect of 
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hyperinflation on the economy, the Argentine congress passed the convertibility law in 
March 1991, establishing the convertibility of the austral into the U.S. dollar at a rate of 
10,000 australes per dollar.  In January 1992 the peso replaced the austral, at a rate of one 
peso for 10,000 australes.  In response to the above strong policy changes, inflation 
dropped to 1% a month (Velde & Veracierto, 2000).   
Throughout the 1980s, many Argentines converted to the dollar in the form of 
longer-term bank deposits and loans.  Current and checking accounts that are usually 
used for transactional purposes were largely denominated in pesos throughout this period.  
In 1992, dollar denominated current account deposits were allowed.  In 1993, checking 
accounts denominated in U.S. dollars were also permitted for residents to use for local 
and foreign transactions (Daniel, 2001).  The wider legalization of dollar based deposits 
significantly reduced the cost of transacting in dollars.  Despite the stronger commitment 
by Menem’s administration to the dollar-peso-peg regime in the early 1990s, 
Argentineans actually increased their use and demand for dollars as the denomination of 
bank deposits, and for transactional purposes.   
This process was encouraged by familiarity with and trust in the dollar and its 
purchasing power (Ize & Levy-Yeyati, 1998).  Trust in the dollar’s value was an 
especially important factor since throughout the years of the Convertibility Plan worries 
continued to haunt the reliability of the currency board.  Argentine citizens’ ingrained 
suspicion of their government’s commitment to reform and the persistence of corruption 
continued to bear down on their trust in the new peso currency.  Despite stable economic 
conditions in Argentina in 1994-1995, the economic troubles of the Mexican peso caused 
international investors to pull their dollars not only from there but from Argentina’s 
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financial sector as well.  Argentina’s ability to sustain the rigid currency board 
arrangement of a fixed peso to dollar exchange rate was put into sever suspicion.   
Argentina took measures to promote dollarization of the banking system to ease 
the liquidity squeeze following the tequila crisis to enhance the credibility of the 
convertibility plan.  In the Argentine scenario, the government encouraged dollarization 
by making it legal to write contracts in foreign currencies and allowing foreign currencies 
to be used as an alternative means of payment (Dominguez & Tesar, 2004).  The 
resulting wide circulation of dollars in an economy makes it easy for local agents to adopt 
and use it, as Jameson (2003) also notes: 
Between December 1, 1994 and January 10, 1995 Argentine banks experienced 
significant peso deposit withdrawals and substitutions from peso to dollar 
accounts…After the Tequila crisis, the dollarization of deposits steadily 
increased, so that by 2001 over 80%28 of time deposits were denominated in 
dollars.  (Dominguez & Tesar, 2004, p. 2) 
Worries about the stability of the Argentine currency board were fulfilled in 
January 2001 when the Argentine peso was officially devalued and all bank deposits and 
debts were “pesofied.” “Dollar deposits were converted at 1.4 pesos to the dollar, while 
dollar loans were subject to one-to-one conversions, effectively imposing the bulk of the 
costs of pesofication on the banks rather than depositors” (Dominguez & Tesar, 2004, 
p. 14.) 
As discussed above, the Argentine financial sector experienced a very tumultuous 
history in the 80s and 90s that was full of economic crises.  These crises almost always 
                                                 
28 This dollarization level calculation may not be consistent with the one this dissertation uses.   
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resulted in strong devaluation of the Argentine currency versus other foreign currencies.  
One byproduct of the local currency instability is the flight to the safety of foreign 
currencies, mainly the U.S. dollar (see Figure 1 in Introduction).   
In the following sections, the model developed in this dissertation will be applied 
to Argentina’s empirical data and the results of the statistical estimation of the model and 
its prediction as well as policy implications will be discussed. 
Argentina’s Data 
The data cover the time span between Q1 1981 and Q4 2001.  The International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF and Central Bank of Argentina’ banking 
sector information was the main sources of regression data.  Other minor sources were 
also used to obtain deposit dollarization readings.  Appendix D provides further 
discussion on these other sources.  Figure 1 in the Introduction plotted the deposit 
dollarization ratio and peso-dollar depreciation time series.  Following are the plots for 
the rest of variables used in the model in Figures 4 and 5.  Table 1 contains descriptive 
statistics of the variables. 
Argentina’s Model Estimation Results  
The Gauss-Newton method of nonlinear regression was performed to estimate the 
parameters of Equation 10 using Argentina’s data.  Table 2 reports the regression results. 
The regression results suggest that about 92% of Argentina’s dollarization behavior can 
be explained by the model as indicated by the R-square statistics.  Also, all the  
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Figure 5: Argentine case study variables: interest rates on local and 
foreign denominated bank deposits. 
   
63
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Argentina’s Model Variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Deposit Dollarization Ratio ( tp ) 84 0.364 0.231 0.051 0.735 
Argentine Peso Dollar Depreciation 
Rate ( te ) 
84 0.211 0.392 -0.007 2.805 
Maximum depreciation rate in the 
previous six quarters ( max6−te ) 
84 0.512 0.73 0 2.805 
Qrt interest rate on local deposits ( ti ) 84 0.253 0.501 0.016 4.102 
Qrt interest rate on Foreign Deposits 
( *ti ) 
84 0.007 0.009 0 0.029 
tt ii −*  84 -0.246 0.505 -4.102 -0.002 
 
Table 2 
Argentina’s Regression Fit and Estimated Parameters’ Results 
R-Square 0.921 
Parameter Estimate t-Value 
φ 0.724 14.536 
γ 0.634 1.975 
α 0.904 15.422 
   
64
parameters have the correct signs and are highly significant at a 95% minimum level of 
confidence as their t-values suggest.  The value of γ produces a transaction cost index of 
σ = 1.643 at its lowest (when the dollarization ratio at 50%).  This σ value suggests that 
there is a strong influence for transaction cost on dollarization levels and agents 
choices.29  The value of α (.9) suggest that agents predict the depreciation rate by looking 
both at this rate in the previous quarter (with a 90% weight) and the highest such rate in 
the previous six quarters (with a 10% weight).  This indicates that ratcheting effects are 
playing a role in the model and in general; agents do care about the holding cost of their 
preferred currency.   
Table 3 shows the results for the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) tests of time 
trend stationarity.  The same tests were also conducted using the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
method.  The two testing methods resulted in similar conclusions, so only the ADF 
results were reported here.30  
The reported ADF test values suggest that the dollarization ratio ( 1−tp ) and its 







p1ln and 2 1−tp ) and 
max
6−te  have a time trends (that the time series  
                                                 
29 The estimated value of σ is also very high and cannot be interpreted readily.  The functional 
term of this transactional cost term is an improvement over the original one that Oomes suggested.  
However, further improvement is still needed to develop a transaction cost term with a better range of 
values.  Also, it will be very beneficial to find empirical sources to measure transaction cost more directly.  
The same comment applies to σ estimate in the Bolivian case study.  A plot of σ is provided in Appendix D. 
30 Phillips and Perron (1988) have developed a more comprehensive theory and tests of unit root 
nonstationarity.  The tests are similar to the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test, but they incorporate an 
automatic correction to the Dicky-Fuller procedure to allow for auto-correlated residuals.  The tests usually 
give the same conclusions as the ADF tests, and the calculation of the test statistics is complex.  Main 
criticism of the Phillips-Perron and ADF test is that the power of the tests is low if the process is stationary 
but with a root close to the nonstationary boundary.  See Appendix B for further discussion. 
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Table 3 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller of Unit Root Tests With a Trend 
Variable Lags Tau Pr < Tau 
Deposit Dollarization Ratio ( tp ) 0 -2.68 0.2478 
tt ii −*  0 -7.29 <.0001 
Argentine Peso-Dollar Depreciation Rate ( te ) 0 -6.54 <.0001 
Maximum depreciation rate in the previous six 
quarters ( max6−te ) 
0 -2.62 0.2734 
 
are nonstationary).  However, )( 1
*
1 −− − tt ii  and 1−te , in the model have no time trends and 
are stationary at a 99% confidence level (see Tau test results in Table 3).  It is normal to 
expect most financial time-series to be nonstationary and for these series to drift over 
time as the plot of the dollarization levels exhibited in Table 1.  After all, the subject of 
this dissertation is the sustained increase of deposit dollarization in Argentina and Bolivia 
over a 20-year period.  It is also sensible to expect the ratchet variable max6−te  to have a 
time trend since it maintains previous depreciation rates for as long as six quarters.  
Generally, regression results are not reliable and spurious if at least one of the 
independent variables exhibit nonstationarity.  However, the Phillips-Ouliaris 
co-integration test values are strong enough to reject the null hypothesis of no 
co-integration.  If two or more series are individually nonstationary but a linear 
   
66
combination of them has a lower order of integration, then the series are said to be 
cointegrated.  This cointegration then can form a stationary linear combination of them.  
Therefore, the nonstationarity of 1−tp  and 
max
6−te  should not bias the regression estimates 
reported in Table 4. 
Argentina’s Model Prediction and Analysis 
Between the late 1980s and early 1990s the Argentine economy experienced three 
episodes of sharp increases in peso-dollar exchange rates: 37% in Q3 1987, 50% in 
Q2 1988 and 280% in Q2 1989 (see Figure 6).  These high depreciation events will be 
used to illustrate how the model predicts future dollarization levels.  A plot of the 
estimated difference in the cost of holding and transacting in pesos versus dollars is 
provided in Appendix D (the x term in Equation 5).  The plot trend shows a sustained 
switch in the advantage a currency from pesos to dollars in the Q2 1990, which matches 
the strong rise in dollarization depicted in Figure 6. 
Predicted dollarization paths31 are generated with the use of Equation (9) after 
substituting the parameters with their estimated values as Equation 11 shows. 
 ( ) ( )


























                                                 
31 See Appendix D for a graphical comparison between model prediction and actual dollarization 
levels. 
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Table 4 
Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test of the Demeaned and Detrended Case32 
Lags Rho .99 Confidence Level Tau .99 Confidence Level 




Figure 6: Argentina’s Q2 1989 hyperdepreciation episode. 
                                                 
32 The critical value for the .99 confidence level are from Ic and IIc tables in Phillips and Ouliaris 
(1990). 
   
68
Equation 11 is plotted in Figures 7 and 8.33  Figure 7 creates two estimated 
dollarization paths, using the quarterly data before and after the 37% depreciation episode 
in the Q3 1987, see Figure 7.   
In Figure 7, the middle curve of Q2 1987 has three equilibrium points (like the 
ones in Figure 3 in the Introduction) with a stable equilibrium at the upper and lower 
points.  The deposit dollarization ratio (pt) was very low in Q2 1987, at about 9%, right 
about the lower equilibrium level.  A near doubling of the depreciation rate in Q4 1987 
shifted the curve upward, so that the dollarization path at Q1 1988 was higher due to the 
ratcheting effect of the sudden depreciation rate jump.  However, the pt level at the time 
of 14% was still below the middle unstable equilibrium point (at about 30%) signaling 
that asset substitution level should subside to the lower equilibrium.  With some financial 
markets’ stability, the four quarters following Q4 1987 did experience a drop in 
dollarization to about 11% (at the lower stable equilibrium point).  The drop was helped 
by a strong premium increase in the interest rates paid on local currency deposits over 
dollar deposit, which increased from a 20% to 43% by Q2 1988.  This strong interest rate 
differential in favor of peso deposits demonstrates the impact of a strong policy initiative 
that can have the ability to reverse dollarization.  As the Q2 1988 dollarization path down 
shift shows, the upper equilibrium almost did not exist. 
By Q4 1990, the depreciation rate dropped to 0% and the dollarization ratio to 
36%.  This stability did not continue for long as another big drop (50%) in the austral’s  
                                                 
33 For the exact values used with Equation 11 to produce Figures 7 and 8 see Appendix D. 
   
69
 
Figure 7:Argentina’s Deposit dollarization prediction 1. 
 
 
Figure 8: Argentina’s Deposit dollarization prediction 2. 
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value took place in Q1 1991.  Without an increase in the interest rate on local deposits, 
the dollarization path for Q2 1991 jumped to the upper curve in Figure 8.  This instability 
pushed asset substitution to 45% by early Q2 1991. 
In March 1991, the convertibility law was passed.  It established a currency board 
that pegged the exchange rate of Argentina’s new currency, the peso to parity with the 
dollar (or 1 peso:10,000 austral).  This drastic move pulled down the dollarization path 
prediction associated with Q3 1991, thanks to the promise of low depreciation rates.  
However, a deposit dollarization ratio of 45% was higher than the middle equilibrium 
point.  Crossing the middle unstable equilibrium point changes the dollarization dynamics 
to that which favors a continuous increase until the upper equilibrium point is reached.  
Simply stabilizing the exchange rate at that point was not adequate to reverse the 
dollarization process taking place in the country because the depository system was 
significantly dollarized already.  The dollar network has gained enough momentum to 
pass the intermediate point, therefore, during the 1990s asset substitution marched 
steadily onward with the help of the growing transactional network of the dollar.  
Replacing the Austral with the new Argentine peso came too late to remedy the situation.  
Dollarization paths during the rest of the 1990s subsided a bit, but that was not enough 
since the dollarization levels have passed the higher middle equilibrium point of about 
50% by few percentage points.   
Figures 7 and 8 provide useful insights not only for academic or speculative 
purposes but also for suggesting possible policies to deal with high incidents of asset 
substitution, which is the subject of the next section. 
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Argentina’s Policy Discussion 
The positions of the curves of all dollarization paths are governed by regression 
coefficients and variables as of a certain point in time.  Of these coefficients, policy 
makers may be able to manipulate two with monetary policy tools, the depreciation rate 
(e) and interest rate differential ( 1
*
1 −− − tt ii ).  The next two figures discuss what happens if 
e or 1
*
1 −− − tt ii  are adjusted.   
Figure 9 displays three dollarization paths.  The upper one is the actual one and it 
is the same Q2 1991curve that was discussed in Figure 8.  This curve can be shifted 
downward if depreciation rate is lowered from 54% to 25% as the middle curve 
demonstrates.  The middle curve reestablishes a lower stable equilibrium point.   
If the depreciation rate is really controlled and brought down to about 5%, then dollar 
depositors should be expected to attempt switch back to the peso and move along the 
lower curve in Figure 9, which only have a lower stable equilibrium.  In this case, agents 
will switch because of the substantially decreased cost of holding pesos rather than its 
network advantage. 
Alternatively, Figure 10 give policy makers the ability to reduce asset substitution 
by increasing the dividends on the peso brand.  We can see if 1
*
1 −− − tt ii  or the interest rate 
on peso deposits exceeded that of the dollar deposit by an extra 30% than what prevailed 
at Q1 1991 (from -29% to -60%) the dollarization curve will shift down enough to 
establish a lower equilibrium point.   
It will take an interest rate difference of 60% to tip the balance of in favor of 
converting deposits into a peso denominated one.  After the curve ratchets down enough,  
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Figure 9: Policy simulation of lowering depreciation rates and the 
impact on dollarization paths. 
 
 
Figure 10: Policy simulation of increasing interest rates on peso 
deposits and the impact of dollarization paths. 
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the dynamics of the peso network gains momentum and can restore both the store of 
value and the medium of exchange functions to the Argentine peso. 
Bolivia’s Case Study 
Bolivia, a country whose financial sector was also extensively dollarized will 
serve as another case study to test the predictive power of the model developed in this 
research.  Bolivia’s struggle with financial and fiscal crisis in the 1980s saw also a strong 
preference in formal and informal markets to holding dollars over Bolivianos, the 
official currency of the state.  In response, the Bolivian government attempted to 
“dedollarize” the economy in 1982 by converting dollar-denominated financial 
instruments to pesos Boliviano at a below market exchange rate.  To prevent flight to 
safety, a range of financial controls were sanctioned like capital flow restrictions, price 
freeze, and interest rate caps.  Peso holders in Bolivia also experienced a real diminishing 
purchasing power as real interest rates were mostly negative during the high-inflation 
period of the early 1980s.  Galindo and Leiderman (2005) note that “in response to this 
high inflation and the prohibition of holding dollar-denominated deposits on shore, 
offshore deposits grew significantly, and financial intermediation declined sharply” 
(p. 1). 
Austere policy measures and market confidence restoration efforts in 1985 
resulted in the adoption of a stabilization package.  This package aimed at controlling and 
reducing the fiscal deficit, increasing monetary policy independence, and removing the 
ban on foreign currency deposits.  Inflation and the fiscal spending gap were successfully 
reduced and financial intermediation resumed activities, however at higher levels of 
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financial dollarization.  Policy makers continued to be concerned about the long term 
viability of the local currency.  They worked to bolster the boliviano by offering market 
based assurances of the future purchasing power of the local currency.  Bolivia adopted 
an active policy to reduce public sector dollarization through the development of 
CPI-indexed debt instruments.  Policymakers preferred CPI indexation to dollarization 
because indexation will allow the local currency to survive beyond the immediate worries 
of its users, with the hope of restoring confidence in its value in the long run.  A 
dollarized system on the other hand that has adapted its pricing, contracts and practices 
will be harder to readapt again to using a local currency with all the associated cost and 
without clear reward (Galindo & Leiderman, 2005).   
In the 1990s a quasi-crawling peg exchange rate regime was given the credit for 
stabilizing the real exchange rate of the Boliviano.  Nevertheless, a 2003 IMF report 
listed Bolivia as the most dollarized economy after the officially dollarized South 
American states.  After allowing dollar deposits again in 1985, the extent of deposit 
dollarization in the banking system rose from 15% to about 92% in 2003.  Deposit 
dollarization was accompanied by a widespread use of the dollar as dollar-denominated 
deposits accounted for 77% of broad money and bank credit to the private sector in 
dollars was close to 97% (Schweickert, Thiele, & Wiebelt, 2005; see also Rennhack & 
Nozaki, 2006) a slight reversal in the intensity of Bolivia’s dollarization was witnessed 
since early 2000.   
In the following sections I will provide the statistical results of applying the 
model developed in this dissertation on Bolivia’s dollarization history.   
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Bolivia’s Data 
All the data used in this dissertation came from the IFS database of the IMF.  The 
data cover a 20-year period between Q4 1985 and Q4 2005.  Appendix A lists the IFS 
data series and the formulas used in the regressions.  Figure 2 in the Introduction plotted 
the deposit dollarization ratio and Bolivian-dollar depreciation time series.  Figures 11 
and 12 are the plots for the rest of variables used in the model.  Table 5 contains 
descriptive statistics of the variables. 
Bolivia’s Model Estimation Results  
The Gauss-Newton method of nonlinear regression was performed to estimate the 
parameters of Equation 10 using Bolivia’s data.  Table 6 reports the regression results. 
The regression fitting results suggest that about 97% of Bolivia’s dollarization behavior 
can be explained by the model indicated by the R-square statistics.  Also, the parameters 
or their restrictions have the correct signs and are highly significant at a 99% minimum 
level of confidence as their t-values indicates.  The value of γ suggest that at its 
minimum, the transaction cost index will equal σ = 1.53 (the dollarization ratio at 50%).  
This σ value suggests that there is a strong influence for transaction cost on dollarization 
levels and agents’ choices (but weaker than in the case of Argentina).  The value of α 
(.95) suggest that agents predict the depreciation rate by looking both at this rate in the 
previous quarter (with a 95% weight) and the highest such rate in the previous six 
quarters (with a 5% weight).  This indicates that ratcheting effects is playing a role in the 
model and in general; agents do care about the holding cost of their preferred currency.   
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Figure 11: Bolivia’s case study variables: The Boliviano’s 
depreciation rate versus the dollar. 
 
 
Figure 12: Bolivia’s case study variables: Interest rates on local 
and foreign denominated bank deposits. 
   
77
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Bolivia’s Model Variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Deposit Dollarization Ratio ( tp ) 81 0.818 0.126 0.321 0.931 
Boliviano- Dollar Depreciation 
Rate ( te ) 
81 0.058 0.304 -0.005 2.722 
Maximum depreciation rate in the 
previous six quarters ( max6−te ) 
81 0.236 0.709 0.008 2.722 
Qrt interest rate on local deposits 
( ti ) 
81 0.04 0.026 0 0.204 
Qrt interest rate on Foreign 
Deposits ( *ti ) 
81 0.021 0.012 0 0.042 
tt ii −*  81 -0.019 0.022 -0.204 0 
Table 6 
Bolivia’s Regression Fit and Estimated Parameters Results 
R-Square 0.972 
Parameter Estimate t-Value 
φ 0.686 22.345 
γ 0.530 3.033 
α 0.955 25.521 
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The conclusions of the PP and the ADF tests of the time trend stationarity are 
similar to that of the Argentine case study (see Table 7).  In Bolivia’s case these tests 








p1ln and 2 1−tp ) and 
max
6−te  have unit roots (that the time series are nonstationary).  
However, )( 1
*
1 −− − tt ii  and 1−te , in the model have no time trends and are stationary at a  
91% confidence level for )( 1
*
1 −− − tt ii  and 99% level for 1−te  (Tau test results in Table 7).   
Also as in Argentina’s case, the Phillips-Ouliaris co-integration test reported 
values in Table 8 are strong enough to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration.  
Therefore, the nonstationarity of 1−tp  and 
max
6−te should not bias the regression estimates 
reported in Table 6. 
Table 7 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller of Unit Root Tests With a Trend 
Variable Lags Tau Pr < Tau
Deposit Dollarization Ratio ( tp ) 0 -1.88 0.6565 
tt ii −*  0 -3.16 0.0987 
Bolivian Boliviano-Dollar Depreciation Rate ( te ) 0 -7.09 <.0001 
Maximum depreciation rate in the previous six 
quarters ( max6−te ) 
0 -2.58 0.2891 
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Table 8 
Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test of the Demeaned and Detrended Case 
Lags Rho .99 Confidence Level Tau 
.99 Confidence 
Level 
1 -66.7871 -58.1615 -7.2613 -5.5849 
 
These statistical results indicate a stronger model fit and prediction ability in 
Bolivia’s case over that of Argentina.  Also, the transaction cost factor is slightly weaker 
than in Argentina, while the ratchet effect (previous maximum depreciations) is weaker.   
Bolivia’s Model Prediction and Analysis 
Figure 13 shows a succession of hyperdepreciation episodes34 that drove deposit 
dollarization ratio (pt) to jump from about 4% in the Q2 1984 to 35% by the Q1 1986.   
Later on, as Figure 14 displays, the economy seems to be locked on a path towards an 
almost fully dollarized depository system by the early 1990s.  By 2004, asset substitution 
subsided somewhat but remained at a very high level.  In Figure 14 it is possible to 
distinguish several periods of stable dollarization ratios followed by jumps to new and 
higher levels (notice Q1 1987, Q1 1988, Q1 1990 and Q4 1996).  These dollarization  
                                                 
34 Depreciation (e) is measured by taking the log of the Boliviano / U.S. dollar quarterly market 
exchange rate, e = ln (Xt / Xt -1).   
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Figure 13: Bolivia’s hyperdepreciation episodes in mid-1980s. 
 
 
Figure 14: Bolivia’s hyperdepreciation episodes in the later 
1980s and early 1990s. 
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level jumps seem to persist even after the Boliviano’s depreciation rate subsided to 
relatively low levels. 
Predicted dollarization paths35 are generated with the use of Equation (9) after 
substituting the parameters with their estimated values as Equation 11 shows. 
 ( ) ( )


























Equation 12 is plotted in Figures 15 and 16.  Figure 15 shows three estimated 
dollarization paths, using the quarterly data before and after the 272% depreciation 
episode in the Q4 1985.  Deposit dollarization levels jumped in 1985 from near zero to 
32%.  Consistent with model predicted asset substitution paths in Figure 15, dollarization 
levels continued to rise gradually over the next year, despite the drop in Boliviano’s 
depreciation rates.  The paths in Figure 11 do drop down.  However, a low equilibrium 
was not established even by end of 1986.  This is explained by the lingering effect of the 
ratchet variable max6−te , which is affecting the expected depreciation rate, which was 13%.  
There was also barely any difference in interest rates paid on local versus foreign deposits 
to compensate customers for the extra risk of holding Bolivianos.36 
                                                 
35 See Appendix A for a graphical comparison between model prediction and actual dollarization 
levels. 
36 For the exact values used with Equation 12 to produce Figures 15 and 16 see Appendix A. 
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Figure 15: Estimated deposit dollarization prediction. 
 
Figure 16: Deposit dollarization prediction for two paths. 
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 In late 1989 another small episode of depreciation (8%) happened, prompting 
further increase in dollarization levels from its already high steady level of around 73% to 
about 82% by next year.  Figure 16 demonstrate two dollarization paths.  The Q4 1989 
path also shows no possibility of a stable low equilibrium and predicts that dollarization 
will continue to rise to a resting point around the 90% level.  However, the prediction 
path as of Q3 1990 shows the possibility of a lower equilibrium at about 15% if 
deposit dollarization was lower than 40%.  The down shift in predicted dollarization 
path was made possible by increasing the opportunity cost of dollar deposits by 
offering higher rates on Boliviano deposits.  The interest rate premium paid on Boliviano 
deposits increased from a 22% on average in 1989 to around 30% in the following 2 
years.   
Since dollarization levels were higher than 40% in 1989 and 1990, these levels 
continued to rise until reaching the upper steady level of around the mid 90% by 1996 
and onward.  The conclusion is that network and hysteresis effects will keep the economy 
at the upper equilibrium point unless drastic measures are taken.  The goal of such 
measures will be to bring dollarization to a point below the intermediate equilibrium if 
possible.  The following section will discuss the various policy options that can be 
exercised to control or reverse the dollarization of the Bolivian economy.   
Bolivia’s Policy Discussion 
A forced conversion of dollarized deposits that bring dollarization ratio to less 
than 40% is expected to favor the peso network.  The dynamics of the model (as in 
Figure 17) predict the economy to rest at the lower stable level of about 12%.  However,  
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Figure 17: Policy simulation lowering depreciation rates and the 
impact on dollarization paths. 
forced de-dollarization can have other adverse consequences that the current model is not 
designed to account for. 
As mentioned in the policy discussion of Argentina’s case study (policy makers 
may be able to manipulate two, the depreciation rate (e) and interest rate differential 
( 1
*
1 −− − tt ii ).  Figures 17 and 18 show what happens if e or 1* 1 −− − tt ii  are adjusted.   
Figure 17, display three dollarization paths.  The upper one is the actual one and it is the 
same Q3 1990 curve as was discussed in Figure 16.  Since the depreciation rate by 
Q3 1990 was relatively low at 2%, this curve can be shifted downward if the depreciation 
rate is reversed to appreciate the Boliviano for example by 5% as the middle curve 
demonstrates.  The middle curve may not do much from a policy point of view,  
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Figure 18: Policy simulation of increasing interest rates on peso 
deposits and the impact on dollarization paths. 
especially when dollarization levels are higher than the middle unstable equilibrium 
point.  To de-dollarize the depositary system, an even stronger measure to appreciate the 
Boliviano by, for example 15%, as the lowest curve shows.   
The ratcheting down of expected depreciation, as the scenarios discussed above 
suggest, can de-dollarize the economy and put it on a path that will settle at a less than 
10% dollarization level.  This suggests that despite the present 92% deposit dollarization 
ratio, a 15% appreciation in peso’s exchange will restore the store of value function to the 
peso.   
The second policy option is to reduce asset substitution by increasing the 
dividends on the Boliviano brand as dollarization paths in Figure 18 show.  We can see if 




1 −− − tt ii  or the interest rate on peso deposits exceeded that of the dollar deposit by, for 
example 20% of what prevailed at Q1 1991 (from .23% to 20%), the dollarization curve 
will shift down enough to have only a lower equilibrium point. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this research is to contribute to the asset substitution body of 
knowledge by building on a model originally developed by Oomes (2003).  The original 
model was modified in many ways to come up with an enhanced version.  The 
enhancements include the introduction of a new predictive variable, interest-rate-
differential, to measure the role of the opportunity cost of holding different currencies on 
dollarization levels.  Some other variables and parameters were dropped, like institutional 
barriers and risk of confiscation.  This addition and removal of predictors is beneficial 
primarily because empirical sources are hard to find for the dropped variables and easy to 
find for the added one.  Also many other assumptions regarding the makeup of the 
economy, the nature of agents, theoretical support for model mechanism and sequence of 
events have been relaxed or their theoretical meaning improved, which helped make 
Oomes’ model more flexible.  The originally assumed functions for the key attributes of 
the model like the transaction cost and expected depreciation were replaced by new ones.  
The revised functions are thought to be more sound econometrically (do not have 
endogeniety problems) and theoretically (giving the transaction cost a more realistic 
shape).  The regression methodology adopted in this research is also much different.  
Rather than imposing a linear based estimation process on a model that is assumed to 
have logistic shape, a nonlinear estimation approach was chosen.  The two main 
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advantages of fitting the model with a nonlinear method are: one, it directly estimates the 
parameters of the model and two, it is expected to produce better coefficient values when 
the variables exhibit nonlinear distribution.   
The predictive ability of the model in this research is tested on two case studies.  
The Argentine and Bolivian experience with very high dollarization of their financial 
sector served as the two case studies.  The model demonstrates good results both in terms 
of fit and significance statistics as well as predictive ability.  Several policy suggestions 
were generated in each case study to stabilize dollarization levels or even reverse them to 
low long term equilibria.  The policy suggestions tested the impact of appreciating the 
values of the local currencies or increasing the interest rate paid on deposits denominated 
in local currencies.  Both of these measures directly impact the holding cost of local 
currencies.  In reality, the adoption of one measure, like increasing local interest rates, 
will also appreciate the local currency.  Hence, the severity of the simulated policy 
measures should not be as hard as presented in this research.  The model simulation is 
also ignoring a host of other economic ripple effects that high interest rates can produce 
and the final impact on money demand in the economy. 
The fact that dollarization is usually imposed in a de facto, market driven,37 
fashion on local economies imply that policy makers do not believe it to be in their best 
national interest.  If they thought otherwise, dollarization would have been adopted in a 
                                                 
37 Dollarization is described at times as demand driven.  Agents in pursuit of their self-interest 
create and propagate dollarization.  According to Dean (2000), the term “de facto dollarization” is defined 
generically to mean “unilateral, unofficial adoption of a foreign currency” (p. 1). The motive for de facto 
dollarization may be to adopt foreign currency as a medium of exchange--“currency substitution”--or to 
hold it as a store of wealth--“asset substitution.” 
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planned de jure fashion.38  Hence, the practical side of this work is to further the 
understanding of how dollarization creeps into local economies, what domestic policies 
are the likely culprit behind it, and what can be done to stop or even reverse this process.   
Dollarization can either be accepted as a bitter pill that may mitigate part of the 
compounded economic ailments of some emerging states, or not.  To choose the latter 
path is to opt for what might be a more bitter process of building and sustaining credible 
domestic measures and financial instruments aimed at restoring trust in the value of 
relatively small money brands that circulate within specific national borders.  Individual 
states obviously need to have a trust worth money and restrained economic policies.  
They can also develop locally based alternatives to dollar indexing, like indexing on the 
basis of local real asset values (see InterAmerican Development Bank [IADB], 2004; 
Singh et al., 2005).   
However, the menu of possible measures to roll back dollarization should not 
include only possible policy measures by individual states.  The menu should include 
regional currency agreements and even unions.  Regional treaties, like the merging of 
small local monies, can create bigger regional brands with bigger networks that make it 
harder for the dollar to supersede.  After all, small is not really beautiful in the arena of 
international currency competition.  
                                                 
38 Panama in 1904 and East Timor in 2000 and the European Monetary Union with establishment 
of the Euro in 2002 may fall into this category.  Other officially dollarized economies like the Ecuador in 
2000 and El Salvador in 2001 did so in response to mounting economic difficulties and massive de facto 
dollarization.   
APPENDIX A 
BOLIVIA’S CASE STUDY 
Data Sources 
The IFS data series used in the regression are: 
The rate of depreciation was calculated by taking the natural log of quarterly 
exchange rate (ln (Xt /Xt -1) * 100) as reported by the series “Bolivianos per U.S. 
Dollar: End of Period (ae) Market Rate.”  
Deposit Dollarization Ratio (DDR) used the series in the Table 9, in the following 
manner:  
DDR = of which: Fgn. Currency Deposits / (Demand Deposits + 
Time, Savings, & Fgn. Currency Dep. 
Interest rate differential (R = Deposit Rate (Fgn. Currency) - Deposit Rate) 
Table 9 
IFS: Bolivia’s Deposit Data by Currency Denomination 
Demand Deposits National Currency Millions 
Time, Savings, & 
Fgn. Currency Dep. 
National Currency Millions 
of which: Fgn. 
Currency Deposits 
National Currency Millions 
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Table 10 
IFS: Bolivia’s Deposit Interest Rate by Denomination  
Deposit Rate Percent per annum 
Deposit Rate 
(Fgn. Currency) 








Figure 19: Time series trends. 
 
Figure 20: Actual versus modeled dollarization trends. 
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Model Simulation  
Table 11 
Model Simulation Data 
Date  et-1 
max
6−te   pt-1  i(t*-1)-i(t-1)  teˆ   σ 
Q4 1989   8%  8%  79%  -0.18%  8%  1.69 
Q1 1990   4%  8%  81%  -0.15%  4%  1.71 
Q2 1990   4%  8%  84%  -0.35%  4%  1.75 
Q3 1990   2%  8%  83%  -0.23%  2%  1.73 
Q3 1985   40%  168%  0%  -3.31%  46%  2 
Q4 1985   272%  272%  4%  -3.24%  272%  1.92 
Q1 1986   45%  272%  32%  0.00%  56%  1.59 
Q2 1986   12%  272%  35%  0.00%  23%  1.57 
Q3 1986   0%  272%  41%  0.00%  13%  1.54 








Nonlinear Regression Results Estimation Summary 
Method   Gauss-Newton    
Iterations   3    
R   2.05E-07    
PPC(g)   3.03E-07    
RPC(g)   0.001228    
Object   6.90E-07    
Objective   7.604016    
Observations Read 81    
Observations Used 81    
Observations Missing 0    
Note: An intercept was not specified for this model. 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value 
Approx 
Pr > F 
Model 3 263.3 87.7728 900.35 <.0001 
Error 78 7.604 0.0975 R-Square 0.972 
Uncorrected 





Confidence Limits t-Values 
phi 0.6860 0.0307 0.6249 0.7471 22.3453 
g 0.5296 0.1746 0.1820 0.8773 3.0332 
a 0.9545 0.0374 0.8801 1.0289 25.5214 
Approximate Correlation Matrix   
 phi g a   
phi 1.000 0.903 -0.195   
g 0.903 1.000 -0.207   
a -0.195 -0.207 1.000   
*Note: Convergence criterion met.    
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Table 13 
Unit Root Tests of Regression Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F  Pr > F
Zero Mean  0  0.4216 0.7836 0.89 0.8983  
  1  0.3174  0.7569  0.5  0.8209   
  2  0.2201 0.7324 0.29 0.7675  
Single Mean  0  -4.9793 0.4278 -3.82 0.0038 10.13  0.001
  1  -5.9543 0.3404 -3.7 0.0056 8.42  0.001
  2  -6.7686  0.2793  -3.75  0.0049  8.1  0.001 
Trend  0  -3.6852 0.9005 -1.88 0.6565 7.68  0.0205
  1  -5.0965 0.8063 -2.23 0.4696 6.89  0.0394
  2  -6.2329 0.7144 -2.51 0.3249 6.98  0.0372
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests   
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean  0  0.4216  0.7836  0.89  0.8983   
  1  0.3917 0.7759 0.73 0.8709  
  2  0.3656  0.7692  0.63  0.8499   
Single Mean  0  -4.9793 0.4278 -3.82 0.0038  
  1  -5.0984  0.4162  -3.66  0.0063   
  2  -5.1786 0.4086 -3.57 0.0082  
Trend  0  -3.6852  0.9005  -1.88  0.6565   
  1  -3.9199 0.887 -1.89 0.6534  
  2  -4.0695 0.8779 -1.89 0.65  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F  Pr > F
Zero Mean  0  0.3464 0.7643 0.65 0.8548  
  1  0.2604 0.7425 0.4 0.7969  
  2  0.1881  0.7246  0.26  0.7581   
Single Mean  0  -3.8497 0.5485 -2.94 0.0446 6.27  0.01
  1  -4.4008 0.487 -2.9 0.0498 5.49  0.0274
  2  -4.8807 0.4372 -2.98 0.0409 5.45  0.0285
Trend  0  -1.8498 0.9722 -0.78 0.9631 4.85  0.2216
  1  -2.7631  0.944  -1.05  0.9316  4.42  0.3052 
  2  -3.4334 0.9139 -1.24 0.8955 4.56  0.2779
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests   
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean  0  0.3464 0.7643 0.65 0.8548  
  1  0.3211  0.7579  0.56  0.8341   
  2  0.3006 0.7527 0.49 0.819  
Single Mean  0  -3.8497  0.5485  -2.94  0.0446   
  1  -3.9351 0.5387 -2.87 0.0535  
  2  -3.9856  0.533  -2.83  0.0586   
Trend  0  -1.8498 0.9722 -0.78 0.9631  
  1  -2.058 0.967 -0.84 0.9576  
  2  -2.1579  0.9643  -0.87  0.9548   
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Table 13 continued    
The Dependent Variable:    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F  Pr > F
Zero Mean  0  -6.0226  0.0882  -2.51  0.0125   
  1  -5.1178 0.1169 -1.98 0.0464  
  2  -5.7608  0.0956  -2.51  0.0124   
Single Mean  0  -9.8352 0.1293 -3.75 0.0048 7.96  0.001
  1  -8.8188  0.1674  -3.09  0.0311  5.32  0.0323 
  2  -10.5624 0.107 -4.41 0.0006 10.97  0.001
Trend  0  -11.1226 0.3397 -3.08 0.1173 7.1  0.0339
  1  -10.15 0.4023 -2.59 0.2881 4.84  0.2237
  2  -11.4562  0.3193  -3.48  0.0477  9.69  0.001 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests   
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean  0  -6.0226 0.0882 -2.51 0.0125  
  1  -6.2143  0.0831  -2.51  0.0126   
  2  -5.9604 0.0899 -2.51 0.0125  
Single Mean  0  -9.8352 0.1293 -3.75 0.0048  
  1  -9.9205  0.1265  -3.73  0.005   
  2  -9.3832 0.1451 -3.84 0.0036  
Trend  0  -11.1226  0.3397  -3.08  0.1173   
  1  -11.3542 0.3258 -3.09 0.1151  
  2  -10.4162  0.3846  -3.06  0.1228   
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F  Pr > F
Zero Mean  0  -11.5112 0.0164 -3.04 0.0028  
  1  -15.5887  0.0048  -3.83  0.0002   
  2  -12.3642 0.0127 -4.19 <.0001  
Single Mean  0  -14.8051 0.0348 -3.24 0.021 5.46  0.0281
  1  -20.7993 0.0065 -4.12 0.0015 8.86  0.001
  2  -16.0665  0.0245  -4.29  0.0009  10.02  0.001 
Trend  0  -15.9862 0.1305 -3.16 0.0987 5.36  0.1212
  1  -22.2542  0.0316  -3.95  0.0139  8.56  0.0042 
  2  -15.6966 0.1382 -3.83 0.0193 9.12  0.001
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests   
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean  0  -11.5112  0.0164  -3.04  0.0028   
  1  -11.6749 0.0156 -3.04 0.0027  
  2  -9.9973  0.0258  -2.97  0.0034   
Single Mean  0  -14.8051 0.0348 -3.24 0.021  
  1  -15.181 0.0314 -3.26 0.0197  
  2  -12.9112  0.0579  -3.13  0.0283   
Trend  0  -15.9862 0.1305 -3.16 0.0987  
  1  -16.5668  0.1153  -3.21  0.0901   
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Table 13 continued    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F  Pr > F
Zero Mean  0  -51.0282 <.0001 -5.96 <.0001  
  1  -18.697 0.0018 -3.02 0.0029  
  2  -15.6864  0.0047  -2.98  0.0033   
Single Mean  0  -55.3057 0.0008 -6.28 <.0001 19.7  0.001
  1  -21.2939 0.0057 -3.21 0.023 5.14  0.0375
  2  -17.0099 0.0188 -2.98 0.0412 4.57  0.0583
Trend  0  -64.9275 0.0003 -7.09 <.0001 25.13  0.001
  1  -29.0151  0.0058  -3.79  0.0217  7.2  0.0313 
  2  -20.9925 0.0424 -3.07 0.12 4.92  0.2083
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests   
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean  0  -51.0282 <.0001 -5.96 <.0001  
  1  -44.0379  <.0001  -5.72  <.0001   
  2  -51.1447 <.0001 -5.96 <.0001  
Single Mean  0  -55.3057  0.0008  -6.28  <.0001   
  1  -49.0891 0.0008 -6.08 <.0001  
  2  -57.0134  0.0008  -6.33  <.0001   
Trend  0  -64.9275 0.0003 -7.09 <.0001  
  1  -60.4064 0.0003 -6.99 <.0001  
  2  -69.5909  0.0003  -7.2  <.0001   
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type  Lags  Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F  Pr > F
Zero Mean  0  -6.5554 0.0747 -1.83 0.0636  
  1  -8.5318  0.0404  -2.04  0.0401   
  2  -10.3809 0.0229 -2.51 0.0125  
Single Mean  0  -7.6594 0.2243 -1.98 0.2955 1.96  0.5771
  1  -10.141 0.1194 -2.21 0.203 2.45  0.4538
  2  -11.3614  0.0869  -2.48  0.1237 3.23 0.257 
Trend 0 -11.6538 0.3085 -2.58 0.2891 3.4 0.5045 
 1 -16.1108 0.1268 -2.91 0.1629 4.31 0.3277 
 2 -14.9854 0.1603 -2.6 0.2818 3.57 0.4716 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests      
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau   
Zero Mean 0 -6.5554 0.0747 -1.83 0.0636   
 1 -7.3534 0.0583 -1.94 0.0505   
 2 -7.9794 0.048 -2.02 0.0422   
Single Mean 0 -7.6594 0.2243 -1.98 0.2955   
 1 -8.6217 0.1761 -2.1 0.2464   
 2 -9.4016 0.1444 -2.19 0.212   
Trend 0 -11.6538 0.3085 -2.58 0.2891   
 1 -13.0312 0.2378 -2.71 0.2353   
 2 -14.2631 0.1864 -2.82 0.1945   
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Experimenting with Different Model Specifications 
Using Equation 10: ( ) ( ) 21414 12 1 +−+−−= −− ttt pp γγσ  and different maxnte −  lag 
values.  See Table 14. 
Table 14 
Values Used in Testing Different Model Specifications 














Square 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 
Para-
meter Est t Est t Est t Est t Est t Est t Est t 
φ 0.68 22.69 0.68 22.69 0.68 21.96 0.68 22.08 0.69 22.35 0.68 22.47 0.68 22.57
γ 0.50 2.91 0.50 2.91 0.51 2.87 0.52 2.94 0.53 3.03 0.51 2.96 0.50 2.91 
α 1.00  1.00  0.98 19.46 0.97 22.76 0.95 25.52 0.97 28.89 0.98 31.80





Figure 21: Logistic probability density function. 
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Figure 22: Logistic cumulative distribution function. 
Parameters: μ location and s > 0 scale 
Support:  
Probability density function (pdf)  
Cumulative distribution function (cdf)  
Mean, Median, Mode: μ 
Variance  
Skewness: 0 
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Extreme Value Distribution 
Definition 
The probability density function for the extreme value distribution with location 
parameter µ and scale parameter σ is 
  
If T has a Weibull distribution with parameters a and b, as described in Weibull 
Distribution, then log T has an extreme value distribution with parameters µ = log a and 
sim σ = 1/b. 
Theoretical Application 
Extreme value distributions are often used to model the smallest or largest value 
among a large set of independent, identically distributed random values representing 
measurements or observations.  The extreme value distribution used in the Statistics 
Toolbox is appropriate for modeling the smallest value from a distribution whose tails 
decay exponentially fast, for example, the normal distribution.  It can also model the 
largest value from a distribution, such as the normal or exponential distributions, by using 
the negative of the original values. 
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Plot 
The following code in Figure 23 generates a plot of the pdf for the extreme value 
distribution. 
The extreme value distribution is skewed to the left, and its general shape remains 
the same for all parameter values.  The location parameter, mu, shifts the distribution 
along the real line, and the scale parameter, sigma, expands or contracts the distribution.  
Figure 24 plots the probability function for different combinations of mu and sigma. 
The Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
An advantage of this procedure is that it is nonparametric as no generating model 
for the time series specification is needed beforehand.  “This approach is nonparametric 
with respect to nuisance parameters and thereby allows for a very wide class of time 
series models in which there is a unit root” (Phillips & Perron, 1988, p. 336).  
In contrast to its chief competitor, the (augmented) Dickey-Fuller test, which is 
based on an autoregressive specification, at least as an approximation to the 
underlying model.  To use the Phillips-Perron test [o]ne needs only to estimate a 
first-order autoregression with a constant and possibly a time trend and to 
calculate the appropriate transformed Z statistic.  (Phillips & Perron, 1988, p. 345) 
“However, simulation studies have suggested that the Phillips-Perron test can 
suffer quite severe size distortions even in moderately large samples” (Leybourne & 
Newbold, 1999, p. 51).  
In the SAS software there are three types of the Phillips-Perron unit root test 
reported by the PHILLIPS option.  They are as follows: 
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Figure 23: PDF plot for extreme value distribution. 
 
Figure 24: Plots of the probability function for different 
combinations of mu and sigma. 
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Zero Mean: computes the Phillips-Perron test statistic based on the zero mean 
autoregressive model.   
Single Mean: computes the Phillips-Perron test statistic based on the 
autoregressive model with a constant term. 
Trend: computes the Phillips-Perron test statistic based on the autoregressive 




MODEL PARAMETERS SIMULATION  
This appendix shows, through a series of simulations, the effect of changes in the 
parameters et, tσ and φ on the model’s predictions in Equation 6 (reproduced below).  
These changes can be used in the model to produce multi steady dollarization states and 
to better understand the mechanics of the model.   
 1**1 ]})ˆˆ2ˆˆˆˆˆ[exp{1( −+−−+−−+= tttttttt piieep σσϕ  (6) 
Following is a discussion of the findings of the simulations. 
The Peso Depreciation Term ( te ) 
The starting values for this simulation are σt = .25 and φ = .03.  See Figure 25. 
Comments 
? At very low depreciation levels et = 2% the curves are convex and under the 
45 degree line (which represents equilibrium positions).  Being below the 
equilibrium line, the dynamics of the model will bring down the dollarization 
level to nill.   
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Figure 25: Simulating the effect of different depreciation rate values on 
dollarization paths.   
? As the depreciation rate increases the initial convex curve changes into S shaped.  
At et = 9% the simulated curve is tangent to the 45 degree line at one equilibrium 
point near 80%.  However, this is not a stable equilibrium point and dollarization 
will be expected to drop down to near zero.   
? A 13% depreciation rate gives us a three equilibria curve.  The upper and lower 
intersection points are stable while the intermediate one is not.  The dynamics of 
the model suggest that low dollarization equilibrium in an economy can be 
maintained as long a threshold is not breached (in this case it is 45% dollarization 
level).  If it is breached, the dollarization will keep on progressing to the nearly 
fully dollarized level of about 95%. 
? A further slight increase in et to 14.5% produces a scenario where there are two 
steady state points.  The lower one can be maintained only under conditions of 
low dollarization (below 35%).  Once dollarization passes the 35% mark, it 
proceeds quickly to very high dollarization levels (over 95%).   
? High and very high depreciation levels (20% and 25%) depict curves that are 
concave and do not intersect the 45 degree line, except at near full dollarization 
levels.   
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Conclusion 
Depreciation rate plays a clear ratcheting role in the simulated dynamic model.  
Low e levels sustain the role of local currencies as a store of value, while high levels 
destroy it.  Changing e will always produce positively sloped curves.   
The Transaction Cost Factor (σt) 
The starting values for this simulation are et = .15 and φ = .03.  See Figure 26. 
Comment 
? At low transaction cost (σt = .15) the simulated curve tends to become flat, while 
at the other extreme, high cost (σt = .5) makes the curve very steep. 
? Dollarization paths at σt = .23 and .42 reflect the position of the simulated curves 
that are tangent to the 45 degree line.  At σt = .23 dollarization levels are expected 
to continue to rise until it reaches around 95%.  At σt = .42 the stable equilibrium 
is the lower point of around zero dollarization. 
? At σt = .7 the dollarization path becomes very steep and the resting point is at 
zero.   
Conclusion 
As expected high transaction cost are most effective in combination with 
moderate depreciation rates.  On the other hand, lowering transaction cost (for example 
by legalizing dollar deposits for example) will flatten the dollarization path resulting in 
rapid asset substitution outcome.   
The Rate Factor (φ) 
The starting values for this simulation are et = .13 and σt = .15.  See Figure 27. 
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Figure 26: Simulating the effect of different transaction cost values 
on dollarization paths. 
 
Figure 27: Simulating the effect of different change rate values on 
dollarization paths. 
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Comments and Conclusion 
All the curves pass through one focal point.  Given the values for e and σ used in 
this experiment the focal point is the center of the graph (.5, .5), but will change if et and 
σt values change.  Increasing the value of φ changes the shape of the simulated lines from 




ARGENTINA’S CASE STUDY 
Data Sources 
The data cover the time span between Q1 1981 and Q1 2001.  The data were 
obtained mainly from Argentina’s Central Bank (BCRA) covering the period from 
Dec. 1989 to Jan. 2006.  For dollarization data from the early 1980s, I referred to monthly 
dollar deposit ratios as reported in graphs in Kamin and Ericsson’s 2003 and 1993 papers. 
In an email, Ericsson stated that the data in his graph came from BCRA and Carta 
Economica (CE), a claim I could not verify independently. 
The rate of depreciation was calculated by taking the natural log of quarterly 
exchange rate (ln (Xt / Xt -1) * 100) as reported by the series “Argentine per U.S. Dollar: 
End of Period (ae) Market Rate.”  See Table 15. 
Interest rate differential (R = Deposit Rate (Fgn. Currency) - Deposit Rate) 
Table 15 
IFS: Argentina’s Deposit Interest Rate by Denomination 
Deposit Rate Percent per annum  
Deposit Rate 
(Fgn. Currency) 
Percent per annum 
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Deposit dollarization ratio (DDR) was calculated as the ratio of Total Private 
Foreign Deposits over the Total Private Deposits.  The DDR used the series in the 
Table 16, in the following manner:  
DDR = (of which: Fgn. Currency Deposits) / Demand Deposits + Time, 
Savings, & Fgn. Currency Dep. 
Table 16 
IFS: Argentina’s Deposit Data by Currency Denomination 
Demand Deposits National Currency Millions 
Time, Savings, & 
Fgn. Currency Dep. 
National Currency Millions 
of which: Fgn. 
Currency Deposits 
National Currency Millions 
 




Figure 28: Argentina’s time series plots. 
 
Figure 29: Argentina’s actual versus modeled dollarization trends. 
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Figure 30: Argentina’s estimated transaction cost. 
 
Figure 31: Argentina’s estimated difference in the cost of holding 
and transacting in pesos versus dollars (the x term in Equation 5). 
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Model Simulation Data 
Table 17 
Model Simulation Data 
Date  1−te   max6−te   1−tp  1
*
1 −− − tt ii   teˆ   σ 
Q2 1987  20%  20%  9%  -20%  20%  1.880 
Q1 1988  38%  38%  14%  -32%  38%  1.828 
Q2 1988  33%  38%  13%  -43%  34%  1.840 
Q2 1991  54%  101%  45%  -29%  59%  1.637 
Q3 1991  4%  95%  51%  -6%  12%  1.634 
Q4 1991  -1%  54%  52%  -6%  5%  1.634 
Q1 1992  1%  54%  52%  -4%  6%  1.634 
Q2 1992  -1%  54%  51%  -4%  5%  1.634 
 




Nonlinear Regression Results Estimation Summary* 
Method Gauss-Newton    
Iterations 3    
R 3.66E-08    
PPC(g) 3.72E-08     
RPC(g) 0.000305     
Object 9.01E-08     
Objective 14.15115     
Observations Read 84     
Observations Used 83     
Observations Missing 1     
Note: An intercept was not specified for this model. 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value 
Approx 
Pr > F 
Model 3 165.7 55.2436 312.31 <.0001 
Error 80 14.1511 0.1769 R-Square 0.921 
Uncorrected 






φ 0.7239 0.0498 0.6247 0.8231 14.536 
γ 0.6335 0.3208 -0.005 1.272 1.975 
α 0.9037 0.0586 0.7872 1.0202 15.422 
Approximate Correlation Matrix   
  phi G a   
φ 1 0.8571187 -0.0104636   
γ 0.8571187 1 -0.2391611   
α -0.0104636 -0.2391611 1   
*Note: Convergence criterion met.    
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Table 19 
Unit Root Tests of Regression Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 0.9362 0.8985 0.97 0.9111     
  1 1.0373 0.9149 1.25 0.9449     
  2 1.1363 0.9289 1.75 0.9802     
Single Mean 0 -1.1623 0.8681 -0.66 0.8513 1.47 0.7002 
  1 -0.7915 0.9022 -0.52 0.8812 1.81 0.6148 
  2 -0.383 0.9332 -0.33 0.9152 2.76 0.375 
Trend 0 -13.1465 0.231 -2.68 0.2478 3.63 0.4607 
  1 -10.7342 0.362 -2.32 0.4187 2.72 0.637 
  2 -6.7264 0.6718 -1.81 0.6936 1.67 0.8431 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests  
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean 0 0.9362 0.8985 0.97 0.9111  
  1 1.0106 0.9108 1.15 0.934  
  2 1.1042 0.9247 1.44 0.962  
Single Mean 0 -1.1623 0.8681 -0.66 0.8513  
  1 -0.9137 0.8916 -0.56 0.8726  
  2 -0.6007 0.9176 -0.42 0.8999  
Trend 0 -13.1465 0.231 -2.68 0.2478  
  1 -12.1259 0.281 -2.58 0.2888  
  2 -10.5878 0.3718 -2.43 0.36  
2
1−tp    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 1.6242 0.9727 1.45 0.963     
  1 1.7489 0.9788 1.87 0.9847     
  2 1.8045 0.981 2.31 0.9948     
Single Mean 0 0.1001 0.9604 0.06 0.9607 1.78 0.6206 
  1 0.4534 0.9743 0.32 0.9783 2.53 0.4334 
  2 0.6663 0.9805 0.59 0.9886 3.61 0.1623 
Trend 0 -13.8387 0.2013 -2.76 0.2161 4.31 0.3263 
  1 -10.8182 0.3567 -2.37 0.3913 3.45 0.4944 
  2 -7.9949 0.5651 -2.04 0.5703 2.92 0.5997 
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Table 19 continued 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean 0 1.6242 0.9727 1.45 0.963  
  1 1.7459 0.9787 1.74 0.9798  
  2 1.8494 0.9828 2.08 0.9907  
Single Mean 0 0.1001 0.9604 0.06 0.9607  
  1 0.3764 0.9717 0.25 0.9743  
  2 0.6122 0.9791 0.46 0.9844  
Trend 0 -13.8387 0.2013 -2.76 0.2161  
  1 -12.3241 0.2707 -2.62 0.272  
  2 -11.05 0.3426 -2.5 0.3274  
Dependent variable (pt log odds) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests  
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 -2.7224 0.255 -1.62 0.0991     
  1 -2.6116 0.2649 -1.63 0.0969     
  2 -2.2635 0.2994 -1.7 0.0847     
Single Mean 0 -1.9916 0.7758 -0.98 0.7568 1.51 0.6889 
  1 -1.7616 0.803 -0.93 0.7754 1.62 0.6623 
  2 -1.2217 0.8621 -0.79 0.8154 2.08 0.5456 
Trend 0 -14.2377 0.1858 -2.74 0.2227 3.76 0.4342 
  1 -13.834 0.2012 -2.56 0.298 3.28 0.5274 
  2 -9.5409 0.4441 -2.04 0.5688 2.09 0.7607 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean 0 -2.7224 0.255 -1.62 0.0991  
  1 -2.6283 0.2634 -1.62 0.0992  
  2 -2.4193 0.2834 -1.63 0.098  
Single Mean 0 -1.9916 0.7758 -0.98 0.7568  
  1 -1.8277 0.7953 -0.94 0.7712  
  2 -1.4976 0.833 -0.85 0.8003  
Trend 0 -14.2377 0.1858 -2.74 0.2227  
  1 -14.1529 0.189 -2.73 0.2256  
  2 -12.9864 0.2383 -2.63 0.2697  
1
*
1 −− − tt ii    
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Table 19 continued 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 -47.0644 <.0001 -5.72 <.0001     
  1 -27.1942 <.0001 -3.66 0.0004     
  2 -10.059 0.0251 -2.16 0.0303     
Single Mean 0 -58.4972 0.0008 -6.65 <.0001 22.12 0.001 
  1 -39.7444 0.0008 -4.36 0.0007 9.51 0.001 
  2 -15.1494 0.031 -2.54 0.1098 3.24 0.2557 
Trend 0 -65.7324 0.0003 -7.29 <.0001 26.57 0.001 
  1 -50.8475 0.0002 -4.94 0.0007 12.22 0.001 
  2 -20.9821 0.0414 -2.98 0.1439 4.46 0.2971 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean 0 -47.0644 <.0001 -5.72 <.0001  
  1 -43.2411 <.0001 -5.58 <.0001  
  2 -43.2784 <.0001 -5.58 <.0001  
Single Mean 0 -58.4972 0.0008 -6.65 <.0001  
  1 -56.5121 0.0008 -6.6 <.0001  
  2 -57.492 0.0008 -6.62 <.0001  
Trend 0 -65.7324 0.0003 -7.29 <.0001  
  1 -64.6276 0.0003 -7.27 <.0001  




Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 -35.2956 <.0001 -4.72 <.0001     
  1 -19.8576 0.0012 -3.19 0.0017     
  2 -13.7805 0.0082 -2.53 0.0119     
Single Mean 0 -45.7167 0.0008 -5.55 <.0001 15.39 0.001 
  1 -28.4346 0.0008 -3.71 0.0055 6.92 0.001 
  2 -21.204 0.0056 -2.97 0.0422 4.43 0.0663 
Trend 0 -57.1042 0.0003 -6.54 <.0001 21.37 0.001 
  1 -41.097 0.0002 -4.42 0.0035 9.77 0.001 
  2 -35.5589 0.0009 -3.71 0.0275 6.87 0.04 
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Table 19 continued 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau  
Zero Mean 0 -35.2956 <.0001 -4.72 <.0001  
  1 -30.6716 <.0001 -4.49 <.0001  
  2 -31.5755 <.0001 -4.54 <.0001  
Single Mean 0 -45.7167 0.0008 -5.55 <.0001  
  1 -42.4899 0.0008 -5.42 <.0001  
  2 -44.5083 0.0008 -5.5 <.0001  
Trend 0 -57.1042 0.0003 -6.54 <.0001  
  1 -55.7006 0.0003 -6.5 <.0001   
  2 -58.0277 0.0003 -6.56 <.0001   
max
6−te         
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 -6.2299 0.0825 -1.79 0.0698     
  1 -6.6927 0.0713 -1.81 0.0671     
  2 -7.5269 0.055 -1.9 0.0549     
Single Mean 0 -9.2156 0.1508 -2.16 0.2205 2.34 0.4801 
  1 -10.3727 0.1118 -2.22 0.202 2.46 0.4518 
  2 -11.6936 0.079 -2.24 0.1928 2.54 0.4316 
Trend 0 -12.1489 0.2798 -2.62 0.2734 3.55 0.4765 
  1 -14.1325 0.1894 -2.72 0.2322 3.81 0.4241 
  2 -15.7634 0.1347 -2.64 0.2627 3.52 0.4819 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau   
Zero Mean 0 -6.2299 0.0825 -1.79 0.0698   
  1 -6.4606 0.0767 -1.82 0.0653   
  2 -6.7139 0.0709 -1.86 0.0606   
Single Mean 0 -9.2156 0.1508 -2.16 0.2205   
  1 -9.7058 0.1329 -2.22 0.2005   
  2 -10.2202 0.1164 -2.28 0.1814   
Trend 0 -12.1489 0.2798 -2.62 0.2734   
  1 -12.7735 0.2484 -2.68 0.2491   
  2 -13.426 0.2186 -2.74 0.2255   
 
   
120
Experimenting With Different Model Specifications 
Using Equation 10: ( ) ( ) 21414 12 1 +−+−−= −− ttt pp γγσ  and different maxnte −  lag 




Modified Transaction Cost 
A modified transaction cost equation: ( ) ( ) 11414 12 1 +−+−−= −− ttt pp γγσ  and 
different maxnte −  lag values.  See Table 21. 
 
( ) ( )





























Discussion of Experiment Results 
The main problem with σ’s second specification in the above regressions is that 
its value is stuck at the upper restriction value of 1, which leads to the conclusion that 
there is no transaction cost effect in the model.  In σ’s first specification (with +2 at the 
end), the estimated values are comfortably within the specified value bounds.  The R-
square values are also lower under the second specification by about .1.  This indicates 
that the first specification of σ has a strong impact on improving model fit.   
( ) ( )





























   
121
Table 20 
Values Used in Different Model Specifications 1 













R-Square 0.922 0.919 0.920 0.920 0.921 0.923 0.922 
Parameter Est t Est t Est t Est t Est t Est t Est t 
φ 0.73 14.41 0.73 14.19 0.73 14.36 0.73 14.39 0.72 14.54 0.72 14.72 0.73 14.59
γ 0.67 2.03 0.56 1.71 0.62 1.90 0.62 1.91 0.63 1.97 0.67 2.08 0.66 2.05
α 0.76 5.65 0.99 10.08 0.91 11.12 0.92 13.48 0.90 15.42 0.89 17.13 0.91 18.62
 
Table 21 
Values Used in Different Model Specifications 2 
R-Square 0.824 0.823 0.824 0.824 
Parameter Est t Est t Est t Est t 
φ 0.453 18.805 0.456 19.549 0.452 17.787 0.450 17.659
γ 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
α 0.959 8.030 1.000   0.975 13.283 0.971 15.871
Bound γ 3.589 2.618 3.456 2.476 3.563 2.552 3.595 2.563
Bound α     4.079 0.912         
R-Square 0.825 0.827 0.826  
φ 0.445 17.808 0.440 18.045 0.445 18.004   
γ 1.000   1.000   1.000     
α 0.952 18.208 0.938 20.570 0.957 22.206   
Bound γ 3.693 2.602 3.819 2.679 3.765 2.667   
Bound α               
 




nte −  lag values results mainly in different α parameter values, which 
affects how the expected depreciation function ))1(( max1 ntt ee −− −+ αα weighs its two 
variables.  Lower α values gives a bigger role for the ratchet variable maxnte − .  The final 
specification of max6−te was chosen because the coefficient was in the best possible range in 
both case studies. 
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